Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide: Case Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat by Petit, Robert et al.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 40
Issue 1 2007-2008
2007
Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide:
Case Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat
Robert Petit
Stuart Ford
Neha Jain
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert Petit, Stuart Ford, and Neha Jain, Exploring Critical Issues in Religious Genocide: Case Studies of Violence in Tibet, Iraq and
Gujarat, 40 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 163 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol40/iss1/11
File: PETIT (July 14).doc Created on: 7/14/2008 12:51:00 PM Last Printed: 7/16/2008 10:38:00 PM 
163 
EXPLORING CRITICAL ISSUES IN RELIGIOUS GENOCIDE:
CASE STUDIES OF VIOLENCE IN TIBET, IRAQ AND GUJARAT*
Robert Petit,† Stuart Ford‡ & Neha Jain§
I. INTRODUCTION
This article was prepared for a symposium organized by the Frede-
rick K. Cox International Law Center at Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law entitled “To Prevent and Punish: A Conference Commemo-
rating the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide Convention.”1 Consistent 
with the general theme of the symposium, the subject matter of this article is 
prosecuting religious genocide. It will explore the contours of genocide 
through case studies of religious violence in Tibet, Iraq, and Gujarat. 
Religious genocide appears to be a small part of existing genocide 
jurisprudence. Most of the well-known genocide trials have focused on ra-
cial, national, or ethnic genocide, even when a claim of religious genocide 
seemed possible. For example, the International Military Tribunal at Nu-
remberg treated the persecution of the Jews as racial genocide,2 although it 
 *  This article does not represent the views or opinions of the Office of the Co-
Prosecutors or any other part of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(ECCC). We regret that this article relies so heavily on online sources, but the lack of a good 
research library in Cambodia forced us to rely upon online sources in situations where hard-
copy would have been preferable. The authors would like to thank Jon MacDonald and Za-
chery Lampell for providing assistance with research and proofreading. 
 †  Robert Petit is the International Co-Prosecutor at the ECCC. He has extensive expe-
rience in international criminal law and has previously worked as a prosecutor at the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor, and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone. 
 ‡  Stuart Ford, J.D., LLM, is an Assistant Prosecutor at the ECCC. He has published 
articles on international criminal law, collective security, and the use of force in international 
relations. 
 §  Neha Jain, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), D.Phil. candidate in law, Oxford University, was an 
intern with the Office of the Co-Prosecutor at the ECCC. 
1 The symposium took place on September 28, 2007. For more information about the 
symposium, the agenda and background material are available at http://law.case.edu/lectures 
/index.asp?dt=20070928. Streaming video of the symposium itself is available at 
http://law.case.edu/centers/cox/webcast.asp?dt=20070928.  
2 While the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal is sometimes ambiguous 
about whether the Jews are treated as a race or a religion, in most instances they are referred 
to as a race. International Military Tribunal, Judgment, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER
1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 171, 248, 272, 282, 302 (1971) (1947).  
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could also have been viewed as religious genocide.3 In its most famous ge-
nocide decision, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
found that Bosnian Muslims represented a distinct national group,4 even as 
it tacitly acknowledged that the Bosnian Muslims could be a religious 
group.5 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has consis-
tently concluded that the genocide committed in Rwanda was ethnic in na-
ture.6 In short, criminal cases of religious genocide are quite rare. 
In light of this apparent gap in the jurisprudence, we attempt to ex-
plore the key elements of genocide through three case studies of potential 
religious genocides. The case studies we have chosen are: (1) anti-Buddhist 
violence in Tibet between 1994 and 2002, (2) anti-Christian violence in Iraq 
between 2003 and the present, and (3) anti-Muslim violence in the Indian 
state of Gujarat in February 2002. Obviously, the most important criterion 
in choosing these case studies is that the victims were targeted because of 
3 Technically, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) treated the extermination of the 
Jews as a crime against humanity, because genocide had not been codified in August 1945, 
when the IMT Charter was created. The IMT only had jurisdiction over crimes against peace, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. International Military Tribunal, Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal art. 6, in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at 
10–11 (1971) (1947). There is little doubt that the acts described in the IMT Judgment would 
have been construed as genocide if they had been committed at any time after the entry into 
force of the Genocide Convention. Crimes against humanity, as defined in the IMT, included 
persecutions based on political, racial, or religious grounds. Id. The IMT could have treated 
the persecution of the Jews as based on religious grounds.  
4 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 6 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
The Appeals Chamber, following the decision of the Trial Chamber, concluded that the Bos-
nian Serb forces viewed the Bosnian Muslims as a national group. See Prosecutor v. Radislav 
Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 559 (Aug. 2, 2001). In two subsequent Trial 
Chamber decisions, the ICTY followed Krstic and concluded that the protected group was 
“Bosnian Muslims.” Nevertheless, neither decision identifies whether this protected group is 
national, religious, ethnic, racial, or some combination of all of them. See Prosecutor v. Vi-
doje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 667 (Jan. 17, 
2005); Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 545 (July 31, 
2003).
5 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 559 (Aug. 2, 2001) 
(“Originally viewed as a religious group, the Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a ‘nation’ 
by the Yugoslav Constitution of 1963.”). 
6 Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 122–24 
n.56, 170–72, 701–02 (Sept. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gerard Ntakirutimana,
Case Nos. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T, Judgment, para. 789 (Feb. 21, 2003); Prosecutor v 
Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 291 
(May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, para. 
422 (May 15, 2003). There is no reason to believe that the genocide in Rwanda could have 
been framed as a religious genocide. 
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their religion.7 Another key concern was how recently the violence oc-
curred. The oldest case study, Tibet, covers a time period that begins in 
1994 and ends in 2002. Meanwhile, the religious violence in the most recent 
case study, Iraq, continues. These case studies present interesting questions 
in religious genocide, including: How does one define the parts of a targeted 
group? What does it mean to destroy the group? And, how does one prove 
genocidal intent? 
The case studies are arranged from the weakest, Tibet, to the 
strongest, Gujarat. Each allows the exploration of a particular issue. For 
example, the anti-Buddhist violence in Tibet appears to have been directed 
largely at the Buddhist monkhood, not at ordinary Tibetan Buddhists. In this 
sense, it does not look like a traditional genocide case, where the protected 
group is usually defined geographically. Instead, it looks like an attack on 
the leaders of Tibetan Buddhism. This case study presents the question of 
when attacks on the leadership of a group can qualify as genocide against a 
part of the group. 
The case study of anti-Christian violence in Iraq presents an oppor-
tunity to look at what it means to “destroy” a group for purposes of the Ge-
nocide Convention. While the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
suggests that the term “destroy” should be entitled to its ordinary meaning, a 
number of courts have embraced a narrow definition of destroy that requires 
the physical or biological destruction of group members. Recent cases, 
however, have tended to give destroy a broader meaning. This case study 
examines the current state of the law on the meaning of “destroy” in the 
context of anti-Christian violence in Iraq. 
Finally, the case study of anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat focuses 
on how one proves the necessary genocidal intent. In Gujarat there is evi-
dence of intent that arises from a number of factors, including statements 
made by the perpetrators, the general political context of the anti-Muslim 
attacks, and the nature, preparation, and repetition of those attacks. This 
case study describes how circumstantial evidence can be used to prove ge-
nocidal intent. Collectively, these three case studies provide opportunities 
for the exploration of some of the most difficult legal and evidentiary prob-
lems associated with the prosecution of religious genocide. 
7 See generally Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, 
Judgment, para. 669 (Jan. 17, 2005) (“The victims of the crime must be targeted because of 
their membership in the protected group, although not necessarily solely because of such 
membership.”); Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 561 
(Aug. 2, 2001) (“[T]he victims of genocide must be targeted by reason of their membership 
in a group.”). 
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II. ATTACKS ON BUDDHIST MONKS IN TIBET, 1994–2002 
The occupation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China (PRC or 
China) has provoked consistent criticism for more than fifty years. The 
years immediately following China’s 1950 invasion were the most brutal. In 
1959, the International Commission of Jurists investigated atrocities in Ti-
bet and concluded that the government of China was committing genocide 
against the people of Tibet.8 More recently, a Spanish court has begun a 
criminal investigation into whether the Chinese government committed ge-
nocide in Tibet beginning in the 1950s.9 While the violence no longer 
reaches the level seen in the 1950s,10 there are periodic crackdowns on vari-
ous aspects of Tibetan culture. Tibetans have sometimes referred to efforts 
to suppress opposition to China’s rule as “cultural genocide.”11 The Chinese 
government denies these accusations.12
One such crackdown appears to have occurred between 1994 and 
2002, when the government of the PRC reportedly mistreated, incarcerated, 
tortured and sometimes killed Buddhist monks and nuns.13 This section will 
examine whether China’s mistreatment of Tibetan Buddhist monks between 
8 Press Release, Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Tibet—Summary of Report on Tibet, Shri Pur-
shottam Trikamdas, Senior Advocate, Sup. Ct. of India, para. 27 (June 5, 1959) [hereinafter 
Trikamdas], available at http://www.icj.org//news.php3?id_article=3415&lang=en (“There is 
also a prima facie case that on the part of the Chinese there has been an attempt to destroy 
the national, ethical, racial and religious group of Tibetans as such by killing members of the 
group and by causing serious bodily harm and mental harm to members of the group. These 
acts constitute the crime of Genocide under the Genocide Convention of the United Nations 
of 1948.”). 
9 See Lisa Abend & Goeff Pingree, Spanish Court Looks at Tibetan Genocide Claims,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 2, 2006, at 4. The Spanish court is investigating claims that 
the Chinese government is responsible for murdering or displacing more than 1 million Tibe-
tans since 1950. Id.; see also Spanish Court to Investigate Tibet Massacre Case, N. ZEALAND 
HERALD, Jan. 12, 2006. It appears that the Spanish investigation is considerably broader in 
scope than the mistreatment of Buddhist monks between 1994 and 2002. Id.
10 See Trikamdas, supra note 8, para. 17 (stating that a “reliable estimate[]” of the number 
of Tibetans killed during the 1950s was 65,000 people). 
11 Jonathan Watts, Tibetans Fear ‘Cultural Genocide’ Will Follow Chinese Railway,
GUARDIAN, July 1, 2006; Exiled Tibetan Official Slams ‘Cultural Genocide,’ GLOBE & MAIL,
July 8, 2002, http://www.tibet.com/NewsRoom/samdhong1.htm. 
12 See Charge of Chinese Government ‘Practicing Cultural Genocide Against Tibetan[s]’ 
False, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 11, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200610/ 
11/eng20061011_310656.html. 
13 The crackdown began in 1994 and appears to have been triggered by a meeting called 
the “Third National Forum on Work in Tibet,” which took place in Beijing in July 1994 and 
was organized by the Central Committee of the Communist Part of China to review China’s 
policy towards Tibet. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHINA: STATE CONTROL OF RELIGION n. 
96 (1997) [hereinafter RELIGION]. For more information about the Third Forum on Work in 
Tibet, see infra notes 28 and 33. 
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1994 and 2002 would, if substantiated, rise to the level of religious geno-
cide. It will begin with a section on the situation in Tibet, and then discuss 
the protected status of Buddhist monks under the Genocide Convention. It 
will conclude with sections on the specific acts that could constitute geno-
cide and the evidence of the intent necessary for a finding of genocide. 
A. Background of China’s Rule in Tibet 
Tibet is in Central Asia; China lies to its north and east, while India 
lies to the west and south.14 It is integrated into the PRC, but retains a de-
gree of autonomy. China’s authority over Tibet is disputed by the Tibetan 
government-in-exile, which is based in Dharamsala, India, and is led by 
Tenzin Gyatso, the fourteenth Dalai Lama.15
Tibet has historically been influenced by China, particularly during 
the eighteenth century, but it effectively enjoyed self-rule between World 
War I and World War II, even though the Nationalist government of China 
claimed Tibet as one of its provinces.16 In 1950, China invaded and occu-
pied Tibet.17 The Tibetan government delegated full authority to the Dalai 
Lama, and sent him to India for his protection. From there, he sent a five-
member delegation to Beijing representing the Tibetan government.18 They 
eventually signed an agreement known as the “17-point Agreement”19
which allowed the Chinese government to take control of Tibet’s foreign 
affairs and occupy the country.20 China claims that the delegation had the 
authority to sign the agreement and that they did so voluntarily. The Tibetan 
14 See Basic Data on Tibet, http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/ 
chinadata/tibet.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2007). 
15 Invasion and illegal annexation of Tibet: 1949–1951, http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper 
/white2.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) [hereinafter Invasion]; Regina M. Clark, Note, Chi-
na’s Unlawful Control Over Tibet: The Tibetan People’s Entitlement To Self-Determination,
12 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 293, 299 (2002). 
16 See Trikamdas, supra note 8, at para. 4 (“[F]rom 1912 to 1950 Tibet was virtually an 
independent country. No Chinese writ ran in Tibet: there was no Chinese law, no Chinese 
judge, no Chinese policemen on the street corner; there was no Chinese newspaper, no Chi-
nese soldier and even no representative of the Chinese government.”); The Government of 
Tibet in Exile: Status of Tibet, http://www.tibet.com/WhitePaper/white1.html (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2007) (discussing the relationship between Tibet and the Chinese government); see 
also Clark, supra note 15, 294–97 (providing a brief history of Chinese-Tibetan relations 
from the ninth century A.D. until 1949). 
17 Trikamdas, supra note 8, para. 5. 
18 See Invasion, supra note 15. 
19 Trikamdas, supra note 8, para. 6; Agreement of the Central People’s Government and 
the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, P.R.C.-
Tibet, May 23, 1951, reprinted in MICHAEL C. VAN PRAAG, THE STATUS OF TIBET: HISTORY,
RIGHTS, AND PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 190 (1987).
20 Trikamdas, supra note 8, para. 6. 
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government-in-exile maintains that the delegation, which only had the au-
thority to state the Tibetan position, signed the agreement under duress, 
including a threat to attack Lhasa, the Tibetan capital.21 China has ruled 
Tibet since 1950.22 One of the first things the government did was begin 
persecuting Buddhists, killing monks, and destroying monasteries.23
B. China’s Hostility Towards Tibetan Buddhism 
China’s opposition to religion in Tibet seems to have its roots in the 
Communist Party of China’s (CPC) belief that religion and socialism are 
incompatible,24 and its fear that independent religious groups might serve as 
a focal point for dissatisfaction with the state.25 The Chinese government 
tends to view organized religion as a subversive force that is subject to for-
eign influence and undermines state authority.26 As a result, China is suspi-
cious of, and generally hostile to, Tibetan Buddhism.27 Nevertheless, the 
Chinese government appears to recognize the importance of Buddhism to 
21 See Clark, supra note 15, at 297–98, 301. 
22 Supra text accompanying note 17; Trikamdas, supra note 8, para. 5. The question of 
whether the invasion and subsequent occupation complied with international law is beyond 
the scope of this article. The authors take no position on this subject. 
23 See Trikamdas, supra note 8, paras. 13–14, 26(d). 
24 The 1982 constitution of the PRC enshrined a right to freedom of religion. See XIAN FA
art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/ 
constitution.html. Nevertheless, the CPC theorized that religion would cease to exist once 
China became a fully developed socialist state. See Cent. Committee of the Chinese Com-
munist Party, The People’s Republic of China: Document 19: The basic viewpoint on the 
Religious Question during our Country’s Socialist Period, para. XII (1982), available at
www.religlaw.org/interdocs/docs/doc19relig1982.htm (“Only after the gradual development 
of the Socialist, economic, cultural, scientific and technological enterprise and of a Socialist 
civilization with its own material and spiritual values, will the type of society and level of 
awareness that gave rise to the existence of religion gradually disappear.”); see also id. art. I 
(“Religion will eventually disappear from human history. But it will disappear naturally only 
through the long-term development of Socialism and Communism . . . .”). 
25 For example, while article 36 of the 1982 Constitution conferred freedom of religious 
belief, at the same time it noted that “[n]o one may make use of religion to engage in activi-
ties that disrupt public order” and stated that “[r]eligious bodies and religious affairs are not 
subject to any foreign domination.” XIAN FA art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html. In addition, the government 
established “Patriotic Religious Organizations” to “organize normal religious activities” for 
Buddhists, Daoists, Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, and other “Christians.” All of these 
organizations were to be controlled by the government. Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party, supra note 24, art. VII (“All patriotic religious organizations should fol-
low the Party’s and government’s leadership.”). These measures suggest that the CPC be-
lieved that independent religious organizations were a potential threat to the state. 
26 See RELIGION, supra note 13, pt 1. 
27 See id. pt. 3. 
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Tibetan society and has acknowledged that it will not disappear overnight.28
China has therefore focused on the short-term goal of controlling Tibetan 
Buddhism and ensuring that it does not represent a threat to the state.29
The CPC appears to have implemented a policy of pressuring 
Buddhist monks to support the PRC and renounce claims of Tibetan inde-
pendence. According to reports, this policy has primarily been implemented 
through the creation of “Patriotic Work Teams.”30 These are teams of lay-
persons who live in monasteries and provide “patriotic” education to the 
monks and nuns. The lessons are compulsory, and monks and nuns are 
tested on material provided by the CPC. It is alleged that Patriotic Work 
Teams have become permanent features in many monasteries.31 Two core 
aspects of this patriotic education require monks and nuns to (1) denounce 
the Dalai Lama, and (2) accept that Tibet is an inseparable part of China.32 It 
appears that the CPC has conflated supporters of the Dalai Lama with the 
Tibetan separatist movement, and concluded that both are anti-
government.33
28 In 1994, the CPC recognized that “Tibetan Buddhism was founded in a certain historical 
period in Tibet, and it has had a widespread and long-standing effect on the people.” THIRD 
FORUM ON WORK IN TIBET, A GOLDEN BRIDGE TO STRIDE INTO THE NEW CENTURY 36 (Tibet 
Information Network trans., 1994) [hereinafter GOLDEN BRIDGE], available at
http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/china/china10.html. The CPC noted seven distinct 
“problems” associated with Tibetan Buddhism but concluded they could eventually be 
solved through the “thorough” application of the state’s “religion policy.” Id.; see also 
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR TIBET, WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH: THE NEW 
CRACKDOWN ON BUDDHISM IN TIBET 7 (2004), available at http://www.savetibet.org/ 
documents/pdfs/2004ReligionReport.pdf [hereinafter WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH] (“In a 
return to the policy that existed before the Cultural Revolution, current policy is based on the 
premise that religion cannot be eliminated by force and will persist for a long time. As a 
result, ‘religious freedom’ should be permitted and the Party should seek the co-operation of 
patriotic religious believers . . . .”) This is consistent with CPC theory, which posits that 
religion will cease to exist, but that the process will take a long time. Cent. Committee of the 
Chinese Communist Party, supra note 24, at para. I. 
29 See Clark, supra note 15, at 320–21 (noting [t]he Chinese authorities believe that Budd-
hism must be controlled in order to develop a sense of allegiance to the Chinese state.”) 
(citation omitted). 
30 See WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 47. 
31 Id. at 51. 
32 Elliot Sperling, Assoc. Professor of Tibetan Studies, Indiana Univ., Human Rights 
Violations in Tibet, Statement to U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee 
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs (June 13, 2000), available at www.hrw.org/campaigns/ 
china-99/tibet-test0613.htm. 
33 In 1994, the CPC stated that the “Dalai clique . . . tr[ies] hard to sabotage lots of things 
in Tibet and in other Tibetan areas. They recognized Lama reincarnations without limit, and 
by controlling the Lama reincarnations they controlled the monasteries and a part of the 
masses. They recruit and bribe monks and common people, even including some of our 
cadres, to be trained in foreign countries, and then send them back with special tasks. They 
also try in every possible way to get into our contingents, and prepare to overthrow the 
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A second method of control allegedly utilized by the CPC is the in-
stallation of “Democratic Management Committees” which are party-
controlled institutions within monasteries that are responsible for religious 
affairs, study, and finances.34 The CPC has used the Democratic Manage-
ment Committees to limit the number of monks allowed in monasteries.35
There are numerous examples of monks and nuns being forcibly defrocked 
or forced to leave monasteries.36
The PRC has also allegedly tried to control the appointment of se-
nior Buddhist leaders in an attempt to place supporters of the CPC in the 
Buddhist hierarchy. Tibetan Buddhists believe that their primary religious 
leaders reincarnate upon death. Traditionally, senior monks undertake the 
searches for the most important reincarnated religious figures, including the 
Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and the Reting Rinpoche.37 Yet, in May 
1995 when the Dalai Lama recognized six-year old Gendun Choekyi Nyima 
as the incarnation of the eleventh Panchen Lama, the PRC took the boy and 
his parents into custody.38 Nothing more has been heard about the boy or his 
family.39 In his place, the CPC recognized another boy called Gyaltsen Nor-
bu as the eleventh Panchen Lama. Recognizing Gyaltsen Norbu as the ele-
venth Panchen Lama has become a core part of testing monks and nuns 
Communists by force. . . . Since Dalai and the Dalai clique have rebelled against us and 
escaped, they have hung on to the hope of gaining Tibet’s independence, and have become a 
separatist political clique. They have become a tool of those who are China’s international 
enemies and have committed a lot of counter-revolutionary activities . . . .” Tibet Justice 
Center, supra note 28, at para. 11; see also RELIGION, supra note 13, at n.20. 
34 According to one NGO, an official document states that “[U]nder the leadership of the 
Peoples’ Government and its expediting offices, voluntarily accepting the oversight and 
supervision of the local government and agencies in charge of religion, the Democratic Man-
agement Committees of monasteries must vigorously support the work of related agencies.” 
WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 28. 
35 One official party document states that “At present, the number of monasteries, monks 
and nuns in our region are sufficient to fulfill the needs of the daily religious practice of the 
masses. About this matter, we must work patiently but should not leave it unchecked.” Gol-
den Bridge, supra note 28, at para. 12. The United States has claimed that “the [Chinese] 
Government has moved to curb the proliferation of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries . . . . The 
Government generally imposes strict limits on the number of monks in major monasteries.” 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 1999:
CHINA [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/www/ 
global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/1999/irf_china99.html. 
36 WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 22, 26. 
37 See id. at 36–37; see also Dalai Lama, His Holiness the Dalai Lama recognizes the 
Panchen Lama, (May 14, 1995), available at http://www.tibet.com/PL/may14a.html. 
38 Id. 
39 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35; see also Elliot Sperling, supra note 32; see gen-
erally ISABEL HILTON, THE SEARCH FOR THE PANCHEN LAMA (2001). 
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within the PRC to ensure they are sufficiently patriotic.40 Further, in 1999 
the sixth Reting Rinpoche was chosen by the CPC. The Dalai Lama has not 
recognized the CPC’s choice,41 and monks have been arrested for protesting 
the choice.42
In some cases, it appears that lesser reincarnations have also been 
disrupted by the CPC. For example, it is alleged that a reincarnated lama 
who was identified by senior monks and installed with the permission of the 
CPC, was stripped of his position when it was discovered that the Dalai 
Lama had approved the choice.43 The CPC has also prevented senior reli-
gious members who are based abroad from searching for or recognizing 
reincarnations.44
Finally, the Chinese government has arrested and imprisoned key 
religious leaders who it believes represent a threat to the authority of the 
state. One significant example is the abbot of Tashi Lhunpo monastery, 
Chadrel Rinpoche, who led the search for the eleventh Panchen Lama in 
1995. Three days after the Dalai Lama announced that Gendun Choekyi 
Nyima was the reincarnation, the Chinese government arrested Chadrel 
Rinpoche. He was allegedly held for two years without charge before being 
convicted of the crime of attempting to split the country; he was sentenced 
to six years imprisonment. Several other members of the team that assisted 
Chadrel Rinpoche are reported to have received substantial prison sen-
tences.45
C. The Elements of Religious Genocide 
For genocide to exist, the elements of the Genocide Convention 
must be met. Like most crimes, genocide requires two things: (1) the appro-
priate mental state or intent, and (2) a physical act.46 These are defined in 
40 See Sperling, supra note 32; U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: CHINA, available at http://www.state.gov/www/ 
global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/irf_china.html [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
41 Letter from Tempa Tsering, Secretary, Dep’t of Info. & Int’l Relations, Dharamsala 
Condemns Pretender Panchen Lama's Enthronement Today: Expresses Concern Over the 
Safety of Tibetans' Real Panchen Lama (Dec. 8, 1995), http://www.tibet.com/PL/dec8.html. 
42 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40. 
43 WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 31. 
44 “Persons of the religious upper strata from abroad who return to visit our prefecture 
must not carry out within the prefecture, activities to try to locate, recognize or enthrone [] a 
reincarnated lama.” WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 31. 
45 Id. at 37; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SELECTED PRISONER CASES: CHINA AND TIBET (1999), 
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/china-98/prisoner.htm; 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35. 
46 International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work on its Forty-Eighth Session, Article 17, commentary para. 4, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 44, art. 17 U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) (hereafter ILC Report). 
File: PETIT (July 14).doc Created on:  7/14/2008 12:51:00 PM Last Printed: 7/16/2008 10:38:00 PM 
172 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:163 
the Convention as (1) the intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group”;47 and (2) one or more of the prohibited 
acts enumerated in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention, including killing 
members of the group, and causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-
bers of the group.48 However, scrutiny of the Genocide Convention by scho-
lars and judges has resulted in the development of additional contextual 
elements that are implied by the language of Article 2. These additional 
elements include: (1) that the victims belong to a protected group, and (2) 
that the purported genocide results in the destruction of a “substantial por-
tion” of the protected group. Each of these elements is addressed below. 
1. Buddhists are a protected group 
Generally, one of the first steps in evaluating a genocide claim is 
determining whether the victims are part of a protected group. The language 
describing intent in Article 2 of the Genocide Convention suggests that the 
victims of genocide must be members of a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group. While there have been suggestions that the four groups listed 
in Article 2 should be viewed as illustrative of the kinds of “stable” groups 
that are entitled to protection under the Genocide Convention,49 the majority 
of courts addressing this issue have declined to follow this approach.50 Con-
sequently, for Tibetan Buddhist monks to be the victims of genocide, they 
must be members of a protected group. 
They could probably be classed as an ethnic group (Tibetans). 
There is also a possibility that they could be treated as a national group (also 
Tibetans), although this would depend on whether one believes that Tibet is 
an occupied territory or part of China. Regardless, neither of these is a good 
choice. The victims of genocide must be targeted because of their member-
ship in a protected group.51 It appears that Buddhist monks have been tar-
geted because they were Buddhist, not because of their ethnicity or national-
ity.52 Consequently, it makes the most sense to treat this as a case of reli-
47 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 
1949, 102 Stat. 3046, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
48 Id.
49 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 511, 516 
(Sept. 2, 1998). 
50 See WILLIAM A SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 130–133 (2000); see also
ANTONIO CASSESE, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 101 (2003). 
51 See Genocide Convention, supra note 47, at art. 2.  
52 The fact that Tibetan Buddhists as a group may be associated with a political agenda 
does not undermine the fact that they have been targeted on account of their religion. On the 
contrary, the fact that they are associated with political opposition to the Chinese government 
because of their religious affiliation goes to show that they are being targeted for their mem-
bership in a religious group. Similar reasoning was used by the ICTR in the context of the 
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gious genocide, even though the victims also belong to other groups that are 
entitled to protection under the Genocide Convention. 
A religious group is one whose members share the same religion.53
It is clear that Buddhism is a religion,54 and that Buddhists are therefore a 
protected religious group. Indeed, at the time of this case study, Buddhism 
was one of the five religions officially recognized by the Chinese govern-
ment.55 As such, Buddhists are entitled to protection under the Genocide 
Convention. 
2. Buddhist monks could represent a substantial portion of the Buddhist 
group because of their leadership role 
While Buddhists are a protected group, Buddhist monks—the sub-
ject of this case study—are a subset of all Buddhists. If genocide required 
the elimination of an entire protected group, then simply eliminating all 
Buddhist monks could not be genocide because the majority of Buddhists 
(those who are not monks) would escape destruction. Nevertheless, the 
wording of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention indicates that genocide 
can be committed against entire groups or against a “part” of a group.56 This 
raises the question of what “part” of the group needs to be destroyed. 
One possibility is that “part” includes individuals. After all, each 
member of a group is a part of that group. Therefore, in some sense, the 
killing of a single member of the group leads to the destruction of a part of 
Tutsis being targeted on account of their ethnicity. Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza and 
Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment, Dec. 3, 2003, para. 969 (Dec. 3, 2003).  
53 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 515 (Sept. 2, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 98 (May 21, 
1999).
54 A religion is “a set of beliefs concerning the cause, nature, and purpose of the universe, 
esp. when considered as the creation of a superhuman agency or agencies, usually involving 
devotional and ritual observances, and often containing a moral code governing the conduct 
of human affairs.” THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY 1628 (2d ed. 1987). Buddhism is “a 
religion, originated in India by Buddha (Gautama) and later spreading to China, Burma, 
Japan, Tibet, and parts of southeast Asia, holding that life is full of suffering caused by desire 
and that the way to end this suffering is through enlightenment that enables one to halt the 
endless sequence of births and deaths to which one is otherwise subject.” Id. at 272. 
55 RELIGION, supra note 13, at 2. 
56 Genocide Convention art. 2, supra note 47. Indeed, it would be absurd to require that an 
entire group be destroyed. As others have noted, not even the genocide of the Jews during 
World War II extended to every Jew everywhere in the world. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a 
situation in which any group of actors, even a state, could feasibly intend to destroy every 
single member of a national, racial, ethnical or religious group. For the concept of genocide 
to have any applicability it must be possible to commit genocide against a subset of the entire 
group. See SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 235–36. 
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the group.57 Yet this would lead to a result where too many crimes are 
treated as genocide.58 Not surprisingly, courts have found a middle ground 
between requiring the elimination of the whole group and treating individu-
al murders as genocide, holding that where genocide is alleged based on the 
destruction of a part of a group, a “substantial portion” of the group must be 
destroyed.59 This requirement reflects a concern that the “part” of the group 
being targeted is large enough that its destruction would adversely impact 
the survival of the group as a whole.60
Usually, the “part” of the group is defined as being a geographically 
limited part of the larger group.61 Thus, for instance, genocide might be 
alleged if all the Buddhists in Tibet were destroyed, or if all the Buddhists in 
a particular town or province within Tibet were destroyed, so long as they 
constituted a substantial portion of the group. However, the “part” need not 
be defined geographically. What is important is that the perpetrator views 
the targeted part as a distinct entity that must be eliminated as such.62 If the 
targeted part of the group is emblematic of the group as a whole, or essential 
57 Indeed, during the drafting of the Genocide Convention, some countries suggested that 
the killing of small groups or even individuals might be genocide, although others disagreed. 
The Secretariat draft of the Genocide Convention set a relatively low threshold for the “part” 
and suggested that group massacres or individual executions might be enough. SCHABAS,
supra note 50, at 230–231. France proposed that genocide would occur, even if there had 
been only a single death, so long as the requisite intent existed. Some other countries, includ-
ing the United States, the United Kingdom, and Egypt, thought that this went too far and that 
individual killings should not be viewed as genocide even if they were carried out with the 
intent to destroy a group. SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 233. See also Matthew Lippman, Ge-
nocide, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 589, 597 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
58 Genocide would lose much of its significance as the “crime of crimes” if individual 
murders were held to be genocide. Infra notes 308–321 (noting that genocide is viewed by 
international tribunals as the most serious crime in international law). 
59 See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, paras. 8–11 (Apr. 19, 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 668 (Jan. 17, 2005); 
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 701 (Sept. 1, 2004); See Prose-
cutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 634 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecu-
tor v. Goran Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 82 (Dec. 14 1999). See also
MACHTELD BOOT, GENOCIDE, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, WAR CRIMES 421–22 (2002); 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, Genocide, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 107, 109–10 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). 
60 Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 701 (Sept. 1, 
2004) (citing Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 8 (Apr. 
19, 2004)). 
61 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 590 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prose-
cutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, para. 63–75 
(Sept. 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 703 (Sept. 1, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 523 (July 31, 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 83 (Dec. 14, 1999). 
62 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 590 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prose-
cutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 524 (July 31, 2003). 
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to its survival, it could be considered substantial for the purposes of the in-
tent requirement.63
The leadership of a group is a “part” of the group, and courts have 
suggested that the destruction of a group’s leaders could meet the “substan-
tial portion” test if the leadership was a “significant part” of the group.64
The leaders who are targeted must be so important that their disappearance 
would have an impact upon the survival of the group.65 This approach sug-
gests that there are two factors that interact in determining whether a sub-
stantial portion of a group has been destroyed: number and significance. 
The more significant the targeted group members are to the survival of the 
group, the fewer of them need to be killed before it impacts the survivability 
of the group. Thus, fewer leaders need to be killed than ordinary group 
members because leaders are more important to the group’s overall survival. 
In this case study, Buddhist monks are not a geographically limited 
group. They live throughout Tibet and are interspersed with the rest of the 
members of the Buddhist group. Regardless, monks appear to be the lead-
ers66 of the Buddhist group. They are crucial to the survival of Buddhism in 
Tibet. Tibetan Buddhism places great emphasis on the transmission of 
Buddhist teachings in an unbroken chain from the Buddha to his disciples, 
to their students, and so on to the monks of today.67 Elimination of the 
monkhood would destroy the continuity of teaching that supposedly 
stretches back to Buddha himself, and eliminate one of the underpinnings of 
Tibetan Buddhism. 
Monks are also very influential, particularly reincarnated lamas. Ti-
betan Buddhists believe that those who have achieved a high degree of en-
lightenment can control their reincarnation. Once identified, these reincar-
63 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 12 (Apr. 19, 2004) (citing 
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 83 (Dec. 14, 1999)). 
64 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, para. 82 (Dec. 14 1999); Prosecu-
tor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, paras. 65, 67–
85 (Sept. 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 587 (Aug. 2, 
2001); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, paras. 702–03 (Sept. 1 2004); 
Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 96 (May 21, 
1999). See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation & Prot. Of Minorities, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, para. 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 
1985) (prepared by Benjamin Whitaker). 
65 Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Dosen & Kolundzija, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence 
Motions to Acquit, paras. 76–77 (Sept. 3, 2001) (quoting Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-
95-10-T, Judgment, para. 82 (Dec. 14 1999)). 
66 Leaders are people who have the special quality of directing the actions or opinions of 
the group. They exert a significant influence on the group. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Dosen & 
Kolundzija, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, para. 78 (Sept. 3, 
2001).
67 WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 21. 
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nated lamas are revered. They are often referred to as “Rinpoche,” meaning 
“precious one,” as an indicator of the respect in which they are held.68 The 
most significant reincarnated lama, the Dalai Lama, is viewed as the spiri-
tual leader of Tibetan Buddhism.69 Other lamas are also significant,70 such 
as the Panchen Lama, who is traditionally viewed as one of the foremost 
teachers of Buddhism.71 Elimination of these religious leaders would affect 
the survival of Tibetan Buddhism.72
In addition to their religious influence, Tibetan religious leaders can 
also wield significant political influence. Indeed, during the 1950 invasion 
of Tibet by China, the Dalai Lama was appointed the head of the Tibetan 
government.73 To this day, the Dalai Lama remains the political and reli-
gious leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile.74 Monks are also crucial to 
the maintenance of Tibetan language, and historically the monasteries are 
education centers in Tibet. Elimination of the monks might threaten the 
survival of the Tibetan language and culture.75
There is substantial evidence that Buddhist monks qualify as the 
leaders of Tibetan Buddhism. They are influential, revered, and crucial to 
the survival of Tibetan Buddhism. This is confirmed by the Chinese gov-
ernment’s hostility to the monkhood. The authorities are suspicious of the 
monkhood precisely because of its influence in Tibet.76 Therefore, it seems 
that the targeting of Buddhist monks could meet the “substantial portion” 
test, and that the monks could represent a “part” of the larger group of 
Buddhists against which genocide could be perpetrated. 
Yet the evidence suggests that a relatively small number of monks 
have been killed.77 Other forms of harassment, like defrocking or imprison-
ment, are far more common. Consequently, it is not clear that the monks 
68 Id. at 29. 
69 Id. at 32 (“[t]he importance of the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, to the Tibetan 
people cannot be over-estimated; as both their spiritual leader and as a powerful symbol of 
Tibetan national identity.”). 
70 Id. at 34–44.
71 WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 34. Indeed, the Panchen Lama’s name 
means “Great Scholar” in Tibetan. Id.
72 See, e.g., WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 35 (quoting tenth Panchen 
Lama’s 1962 Petition to Mao Zedong, “Those who have religious knowledge will slowly die 
out, religious affairs are stagnating, knowledge is not being passed on, there is worry about 
there being no training for new people, and so we see the elimination of Buddhism [in Ti-
bet].”). 
73 See Invasion, supra note 15. 
74 Tibet at a Glance, http://www.tibet.com/glance.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). 
75 See WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 25. 
76 See supra notes 24–45 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of China’s hostili-
ty to Tibetan Buddhism).  
77 See infra Section II.C.4. 
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that have been killed or seriously injured are numerous or important enough 
to represent a “significant part” of the overall group. Nevertheless, if 
enough Buddhists monks were targeted, it could be genocide. 
3. The Chinese authorities have committed acts which could be consi-
dered genocidal if accompanied by the requisite intent 
Having established that Buddhist monks could be a protected part 
of a religious group for the purposes of the Genocide Convention, this sec-
tion looks at whether they have been the subject of acts prohibited by the 
Convention. Article 2 contains a list of prohibited acts: (1) killing members 
of the group, (2) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group, (3) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction, (4) imposing measures intended to pre-
vent births within the group, and (5) forcibly transferring children of the 
group to another group.78 There is no evidence that the government has in-
flicted conditions of life calculated to destroy Buddhist monks, imposed 
measures to prevent births amongst Buddhist monks, or forcibly transferred 
children to other groups. Consequently, this section will focus on the first 
two categories of physical acts described in Article 2. 
a. Unlawful killings and the infliction of serious bodily or mental harm 
on Buddhist monks 
In order to constitute killing, two elements must be present: (1) the 
victim must be dead, and (2) the death must have resulted from an unlawful 
act or omission of the accused or a subordinate.79 There is no minimum 
number of deaths that must occur in order for the element of “killing” to be 
satisfied80 because the quantitative aspect—that genocide involves the de-
struction of a group “in whole or in part”—belongs to the mental element of 
the crime.81 The term “serious bodily or mental harm” has been interpreted 
to include acts of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, and persecu-
tion.82 It also includes harm that seriously injures health, causes disfigure-
78 Genocide Convention, supra note 47, art. 2. 
79 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 588–89 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
80 See Antonio Cassese, Genocide, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 335, 348 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). 
81 SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 158. 
82 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 504 (Sept. 2, 1998); 
Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, Review of the 
Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 93 (July 11, 
1996).
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ment, or causes serious injury to the organs or senses.83 The harm does not 
need to be permanent or irremediable.84
While the Genocide Convention treats the killing of group members 
and the infliction of serious harm as two different acts, they are addressed 
together here because they often arise together. There is evidence that Chi-
nese authorities have made Buddhist monks the target of physical attacks, 
torture, and unlawful killing. For example, Norbu, a seventeen year old 
monk, and three fellow monks were detained at their monastery. Norbu was 
then allegedly taken to a detention center where he was “brutally interro-
gated.” He was denied access to medical treatment and died, apparently of 
injuries sustained during detention.85 In another case, a twenty-two year old 
monk was arrested in 1996 for participating in a pro-Dalai Lama protest. He 
reportedly died six days after his release from prison as a result of torture 
suffered there.86 Similarly, a monk at Thenthok monastery allegedly fell 
from a third floor window to his death after interrogation by government 
officials for protesting the removal of the Dalai Lama’s picture from the 
monastery. Three other monks were also allegedly severely beaten for the 
same crime.87
Another well-documented case concerns the monks Tenzin Delek 
and Lobsang Dondrup. Lobsang Dondrup was arrested and allegedly tor-
tured into confessing to a bombing. He implicated Tenzin Delek. Although 
Dondrup repudiated his confession during his sentencing hearing, Delek 
was arrested with three other monks. They were allegedly beaten while in 
detention. He and Lobsang were put on trial after eight months in detention 
and found guilty. Lobsang was immediately executed, and Delek was sen-
tenced to death,88 but this was later commuted into a life sentence.89 Similar 
83 Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 109 
(May 21, 1999). 
84 Id. at para. 108 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 
502 (Sept. 2, 1998)). 
85 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Civil and 
Political Rights Including Questions of Torture and Detention, para. 224, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2000/9 (Feb. 2, 2000) (prepared by Nigel Rudley). In another case, two monks were 
arrested, incarcerated, and severely beaten, for the “crime” of writing to the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Id. at para. 223. The Special Rapporteur has also noted the 
Chinese government’s practice of claiming that those who have died while incarcerated have 
committed suicide: “Four nuns who protested all died on the same day in the same way while 
held in strict solitary confinement.” Sperling, supra note 32, at Torture and Abuse in Prison. 
86 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, ann. at §I. 
87 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, ann. at §I. 
88 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRIAL OF A TIBETAN MONK: THE CASE OF TENZIN DELEK 
(2004).
89 International Campaign for Tibet: Campaigns: Tenzin Delek Rinpoche, http://www. 
savetibet.org/campaigns/tdr/index.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2008). 
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allegations of beatings, torture, and killings have arisen repeatedly between 
1994 and 2002.90
As these examples demonstrate, it seems likely that there have been 
killings of Buddhist monks and instances where Buddhist monks have been 
subjected to serious bodily or mental harm, mostly through beatings and 
torture. These are physical acts that could constitute genocide. Yet, whether 
or not they actually constitute genocide depends on the intent with which 
they were carried out, and the existence of the requisite contextual elements. 
In this sense, the physical acts of genocide are the easiest elements of a ge-
nocide claim to prove. These acts must exist for there to be genocide, but 
not every killing is genocide. Indeed, the vast majority of killings are not 
genocide. Thus, it is the intent and the other contextual elements that turn 
unlawful killings and beatings into genocide. 
b. Other acts that could be relevant to the existence of genocide 
It is also worth noting that the authorities have arbitrarily impri-
soned monks, forcibly defrocked monks, manipulated the appointment of 
reincarnated lamas, and attempted to exert control over Tibetan Buddhism.91
These actions cannot constitute the physical acts of genocide because they 
do not fall within any of the enumerated acts laid out in Article 2 of the Ge-
nocide Convention. Nevertheless, they still could be relevant to a conviction 
for genocide because they could be inferential evidence of genocidal in-
tent.92
90 See International Campaign for Tibet: Tibetan Prisoners of Conscience,
http://www.savetibet.org/news/positionpapers/prisonsersofconscience.php (last visited Mar. 
21, 2008); Ronald Schwartz, Religious Persecution in Tibet (on file with the Canada Tibetan 
Community); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm on Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities, The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and Its 
Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation, paras. 
5–7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/NGO/51 (Feb. 3, 2000); U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council 
[ECOSOC], Sub-Comm on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Ques-
tion of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN/Sub.2/1999/NGO/9 (June 24, 1999).  
91 Supra Part II.B. 
92 Genocidal intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Prosecutor v. Sikirica, 
Dosen & Kolundzija, Case No. IT-95-8-T, Judgment on Defence Motions to Acquit, para. 61 
(Sept. 3, 2001); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 47 (July 5, 
2001). For example, the general political doctrine that gave rise to the genocidal acts can be 
considered. Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, Re-
view of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 
94 (July 11, 1996). The existence of attacks on cultural and religious property and symbols 
may also be relevant. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 580 (Aug. 
2, 2001). 
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4. The evidence suggests that the Chinese authorities intended to control 
the monkhood, not destroy it 
The most significant limitation on the application of genocide is the 
specific intent requirement. It requires proof that “the perpetrator clearly 
seeks to produce the act charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of 
genocide lies in ‘the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic-
al, racial or religious group, as such.’”93 This is a significantly higher evi-
dentiary burden than that generally applicable to other violations of interna-
tional criminal law, like war crimes or crimes against humanity.94
Intent, by its very nature, refers to what is going on in the mind of 
the accused at the time of the alleged crime. But unless the accused testifies 
about his intent, there is usually little direct evidence of genocidal intent. 
Instead, intent is usually inferred from surrounding circumstances.95 Cir-
cumstantial evidence that may be considered includes:96 the general political 
doctrine that gave rise to the acts,97 the context of the preparation and repeti-
tion of the acts,98 and “simultaneous attacks on cultural and religious prop-
erty and symbols.”99 All of these factors are present to some degree. The 
Chinese government is generally hostile to Tibetan Buddhism; there appears 
to have been a repetition of potentially genocidal acts, like the arrest, tor-
ture, and killing of monks; and these acts have been accompanied by simul-
taneous attacks on religious property and symbols. Nevertheless, on bal-
ance, the evidence suggesting that the attacks on, and killings of, Tibetan 
Buddhist monks were carried out with the specific intent of destroying the 
Buddhist monkhood is relatively weak.  
93 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 498 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
94 See infra Part V and accompanying text. 
95 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 523 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(noting that “in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be inferred from 
a certain number of presumptions of fact”). 
96 Other factors may also be relevant. The section on anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat 
contains a more complete discussion of the circumstantial evidence that can be used to dem-
onstrate genocidal intent. See infra Part IV. 
97 Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, Review of the 
Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 94 (July 11, 
1996).
98 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 523–524 (Sept. 2, 
1998) (citing Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, 
Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, para. 
94 (July 11, 1996)); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, para. 47 (July, 5 
2001); see also Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, paras. 980–84 (Sept. 
1, 2004) (discussing the nature of the Bosnian Serb leadership’s plan and the perpetration 
committed as part of that plan). 
99 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 580 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
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In contrast, there is relatively strong evidence that the intent of the 
Chinese authorities was to control the monkhood, not eradicate it.100 While 
monks have been defrocked, attacked, imprisoned, tortured, and even killed, 
many monasteries still exist and many monks still reside in them. Rather 
than eliminating Buddhist monks, the government seems to have focused on 
controlling the monkhood by installing “Patriotic Work Teams” and “Dem-
ocratic Management Committees” in monasteries and manipulating the ap-
pointment of senior monks. Indeed, the Chinese government seems to have 
acknowledged that Buddhism is too important to the people of Tibet for it to 
be eliminated.101 Taken together, these facts suggest that the intent of the 
authorities was to control Tibetan Buddhism, not to destroy it.102 Conse-
quently, the evidence suggests that specific intent was lacking and the mi-
streatment of Buddhist monks in Tibet between 1994 and 2002 probably 
should not be considered genocide. 
III. ANTI-CHRISTIAN VIOLENCE IN IRAQ, 2003–2007 
Since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, there have been high levels of 
violence in Iraq. Much of this violence appears to be driven by ethnic and 
religious differences. It is not uncommon for journalists, academics, and 
politicians to ask whether the violence in Iraq should be called genocide.103
Usually, such discussions focus on the ongoing tensions between Shia and 
Sunni extremist groups, but there have been claims by various Christian 
groups that attacks against the Christians in Iraq constitute genocide.104 This 
section examines anti-Christian violence in Iraq in more detail and tries to 
100 See supra Part. II.B. 
101 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
102 It is theoretically possible that the authorities could simultaneously intend to control 
Tibetan Buddhism and destroy the monkhood, but the evidence does not suggest that this is 
the case. The authorities appear to want control over the monasteries in order to identify and 
remove monks who support the Dalai Lama or Tibetan independence, not as a means to 
destroy the monkhood itself. WHEN THE SKY FELL TO EARTH, supra note 28, at 47–49. 
103 See Samantha Power, How to stop genocide in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2007, at A15, 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-power5mar05,0,3348120.story?coll=la-opinion-
center (last visited Apr. 7, 2008); Massimo Calabresi, Is Iraq Headed for Genocide?, TIME
29, Nov. 29, 2006, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1564270,00.html (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2008); Associated Press, Obama: Don’t stay in Iraq over genocide, July 20, 
2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19862711/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2008). 
104 Jack Fairweather, Christians Flee Genocide as Fear Sweeps Iraq, CHRISTIANS OF IRAQ,
Jan. 8 2005, http://www.christiansofiraq.com/fear2.html; Mounting Fears of Assyrian Geno-
cide in Iraq, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEW AGENCY, May 31, 2007, http://www.aina.org/releases 
/2007053195824.htm; Interview with Rosie Malek-Yonan, Author of THE CRIMSON FIELD,
on the Religion Report (May 30, 2007), http://www.abc.net.au/rn/religionreport/stories/2007 
/1937124.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
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draw some conclusions about whether genocide is occurring against Iraq’s 
Christian minority. 
A. Background of Violence in Iraq 
Iraq is a country of multiple ethnicities and religions. Out of a total 
population of approximately 27.5 million, Muslims comprise 97% of the 
population (Shia 60–65%, Sunni 32–37%). The remaining 3% of the popu-
lation belongs to a range of different religions and denominations.105 These 
include various Christian groups, like Chaldeans, Assyrians, Syriacs, Arme-
nians, and Protestants, as well as non-Christian groups such as the Yazidi, 
Sabean, Baha’i, Kaka’i, and Jews.106 It appears there are between 600,000 
and 800,000 Christians in Iraq.107 The largest Iraqi Christian groups are 
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Armenians, and Catholics. The majority of Assyrian 
Christians can be found in the province of Nineveh.108 There are also signif-
icant Assyrian communities in and around Baghdad. The remaining Chris-
tians are mainly from areas around the southern city of Basra.109
Iraq has witnessed high levels of sectarian violence since the U.S.-
led invasion in March 2003. There are continuing reports of murders, ab-
ductions, torture, and destruction of property.110 According to the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), during 2006, more than 
34,000 civilians were killed and more than 36,000 were wounded.111 Many 
105 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 272 (2006). The ethnic com-
position of Iraq is 75–80% Arab and 15–20% Kurdish, with the remaining 5% being made up 
of Turkomans, Assyrians, and others. Id.
106 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 
2005: IRAQ (NOV. 8, 2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51600.htm.
107 Michael Luo, Iraq’s Christians Flee as Extremist Threat Worsens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2006, at A8. According to some Christian sources, the total number of Christians in Iraq is 
approximately 800,000. Iraqi Christians Seek To Escape Pressure From Islamist Extremists,
ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 30, 2004, http://www.aina.org/releases/ 
20040930115327.htm; We Are In The Modern Catacombs, Says Young Iraqi Catholic, 
CHRISTIANS OF IRAQ, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.christiansofiraq.com/siege.html. Some others 
have placed the number as low as 600,000. Luo at A8. A number between 600,000 and 
800,000 is roughly consistent with Christians comprising a large majority of the 3% of the 
Iraqi population that is not Muslim. Id. However, the last census was conducted in 1987 and 
it is difficult to be certain about the size of the current Christian population of Iraq. Id.
108 U.N. High Commission for Refugees [UNHCR], Background Information on the Situa-
tion of Non-Muslim Religious Minorities in Iraq, (Oct. 2005) [hereinafter UNHCR Back-
ground]. The capital of Nineveh Province is the city of Mosul. Id.
109 Id.
110 PRETI TANEJA, MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP INT’L, ASSIMILATION, EXODUS, ERADICATION:
IRAQ’S MINORITY COMMUNITIES SINCE 2003 5 (2007), available at http://www.minority 
rights.org/?lid=2805. 
111 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq [UNAMI], Human Rights Report:1 Novem-
ber–31 December 2006 (2007). The estimates of some experts are much higher. One group 
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different insurgent groups are thought to be responsible for the attacks, in-
cluding Sunni Islamist groups, al-Qaeda, Ba’athists and the remnants of 
Saddam Hussein’s supporters, Shia militias, and a range of criminal 
gangs.112 Some groups are linked to members of the Iraqi government or are 
supported by neighboring countries, including Iran and Syria. “The Iraq 
Security Force (ISF), the police and the Multinational Force in Iraq have 
also been responsible for deaths.”113 Since the 2005 elections, most secta-
rian violence has been between Shiites and Sunnis,114 but there have also 
been significant attacks against Christians.  
B. Targeting of the Iraqi Christian Community 
According to the United States Commission on International Reli-
gious Freedom,115 while the turbulent situation in Iraq affects all Iraqis, non-
Muslim minorities have been particularly affected.116 Christians are consi-
dered to be “non-believers” or infidels by Iraqi extremists, and are vulnera-
ble to attack.117 Attacks on Christians have become common since the U.S.-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003 for a number of reasons, including the percep-
tion that Iraqi Christians are aiding the Americans,118 and a belief among 
many Muslim Iraqis that the U.S.-led invasion is a crusade against Islam.119
The Christian community in Iraq has been targeted throughout the country, 
of researchers concluded that total excess mortality exceeded 100,000 in Iraq between 2003 
and 2004. Burnham et al., infra note 190, at 1. The group further estimates that there had 
been anywhere from 300,000 to 900,000 excess Iraqi deaths as a consequence of the Iraq war 
by 2006. Id.
112 Id. 
113 TANEJA, supra note 109, at 5. 
114 INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, THE NEXT IRAQI WAR: SECTARIANISM AND CIVIL
CONFLICT 1 (2006). 
115 The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is a U.S. government body 
that was created to monitor the status of freedom of religion and provide policy advice to the 
U.S. government on issues related to freedom of religion. UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.uscirf.gov 
/about/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2008). 
116 Letter from Michael Cromartie, Chairman, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religions Freedom, to 
Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State (Sept. 5, 2007) [hereinafter USCIRF], 
http://www.uscirf.gov/mediaroom/press/2007/september/20070906RiceLetterIraq.html. 
117 Iraq: Baghdad Christians Flee Forced Conversion, COMPASS DIRECT NEWS, Apr. 18, 
2007, http://www.compassdirect.org/en/display.php?page=news&length=long&lang=en& 
idelement=4834. 
118 Christopher Allbritton, Iraq’s Persecuted Christians, TIME, Sept. 20 2004, at 43; Kathe-
rine Zoepf, The Reach of War: Exodus; Many Christians Flee Iraq, with Syria the Haven of 
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5 2004, at A11. 
119 Luo, supra note 107, at A1; Christians Fleeing Violence in Iraq, FOX NEWS, May 7 
2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,270377,00.html. 
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particularly in Baghdad, Mosul, Basra, and the northern Kurdish regions.120
Numerous organizations, including the United Nations and the Iraqi gov-
ernment, as well as Christian religious leaders have noted that Christians are 
targeted because of their religious beliefs.121
C. Iraqi Christians are a Protected Group 
The first step in analyzing a genocide claim is identifying the victim 
group and deciding whether it is entitled to protection under the Genocide 
Convention.122 Many of the victims in Iraq could be viewed as members of 
either a religious group or an ethnic group. For example, the Chaldeans and 
Assyrians would probably be entitled to separate protection as an ethnic 
group.123 Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that the victims were chosen 
because of their religion, rather than their ethnicity.124 Accordingly, it 
makes more sense to focus on their existence as a religious group.125 Chris-
120 USCIRF, supra note 116. Baghdad alone accounts for slightly more than half of all 
civilian and police war related killings in Iraq. Violence Appears to be Shifting from Bagh-
dad, MSNBC, Aug. 25, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20440397/. Christians live in 
disproportionately greater numbers in Baghdad, and have thus been more severely affected 
by the violence in Iraq. Eden Naby, Letter to the Editor, Reply by Peter W Galbraith, The 
Plight of Christians in Iraq, N. Y. REV. OF BOOKS 69, Nov. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19677 [hereinafter Naby & Galbraith]. 
121 Juan Méndez, the U.N. Secretary-General’s special advisor on the prevention of 
genocide, has stated that minorities in Iraq are being targeted solely on account of religion. 
Calabresi, supra note 104, at 29. Representatives of UNHCR have also expressed concern 
that the Iraqi Christian community is being persecuted. Iraqi Christians Debate Self-
Autonomy to Halt Exodus, ASSYRIAN INT’L NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 22 2006, 
http://www.aina.org/news/20061223033558.htm. Hummam Dairi, from the Iraqi Ministry of 
Human Rights acknowledged that the Iraqi Christians are being targeted because of their 
religious affiliation. Integrated Regional Information Networks, Christians Live in Fear of 
Death Squads, Oct. 19, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=61897. Chris-
tian religious leaders are also increasingly worried by what they perceive as the systematic 
targeting of Christian Assyrians in Iraq. Human Rights Without Frontiers, Former Anglican 
Head Warns of Abuses against Assyrians in Iraq, Jan. 24 2005, 
http://www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/2005PDF/Iraq_2005.pdf.
122 Supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
123 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT: IRAQ (2006) [herei-
nafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/ 
2006/71422.htm. (“The Chaldean and Assyrian Christians are descendants of the earliest 
Christian communities, and they share a similar cultural and linguistic background. Both 
communities speak the same ancient language (Syriac); however, they are considered by 
many to be distinct ethnic groups. . . . While some Chaldeans and Assyrians consider them-
selves Arab, the majority, as well as the Government, considered both groups as ethnically 
distinct from Arabs and Kurds.”). Id.
124 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
125 A religious group is one whose members share the same religion. See supra note 53 and 
accompanying text. 
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tians in Iraq are entitled to protection as a religious group because they 
share the same religion.126 Moreover, the individual Christian denomina-
tions in Iraq are probably also entitled to protection.127 Thus, Assyrians or 
Chaldeans could be the victims of genocide as Christians or as parts of their 
own denomination, depending on the evidence. 
D. There is Evidence of Genocidal Acts 
There is no evidence to suggest that the Iraqi Christians have been 
subjected to any of the acts enumerated in clauses (c) to (e) of Article 2 of 
the Genocide Convention. Accordingly, this section will focus on the kil-
lings of members of the group, and causing them serious bodily or mental 
harm.128
1. Coordinated attacks on churches have resulted in many deaths 
Many Iraqi Christians have been killed or grievously injured as a 
result of attacks on churches. For example, five churches were bombed in 
what looked like a series of orchestrated attacks in Baghdad and Mosul on 
August 1, 2004.129 At least eleven people were reported to have been killed 
and dozens of others were injured.130 An Islamic militant group claimed 
responsibility for the attacks.131
126 See RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT, supra note 123 (noting that while there are differenc-
es amongst the different Christian groups in Iraq, for example the Chaldeans recognize the 
primacy of the Pope but the Assyrians do not, all share the same religion). Id.
127 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 515 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(“The religious group is one whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode 
of worship”); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 
para. 98 (May 21, 1999) (“A religious group includes denomination or mode of worship or a 
group sharing common beliefs.”). 
128 Geneva Convention, supra note 47, art. 2. To constitute killing, the victim must be dead, 
and the death must have resulted from an unlawful act of the accused. See supra text accom-
panying note 79. There is no minimum number of deaths that must occur for the crime of 
killing to be made out. See supra text accompanying notes 80–81. “Serious bodily or mental 
harm” encompasses acts of torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, and harm that seriously 
injures health, causes disfigurement, or causes serious injury to the organs or senses. Supra 
text accompanying notes 82–83. The harm caused can be temporary and remediable. Supra 
text accompanying note 84.  
129 The first blast occurred as a car bomb detonated outside an Armenian church in Bagh-
dad, and three other churches were hit soon after. A blast was reported around the same time 
in Mosul. Bomb Blasts Rock Iraqi Churches, BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3526084.stm; Car Bombs Target Christian Churches 
in Iraq, VOICE OF AMERICA, Aug. 1, 2004, http://www.voanews.com/burmese/archive/2004-
08/a-2004-08-01-3-1.cfm.  
130 Bomb Blasts Rock Iraqi Churches, supra note 129. 
131 See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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Several other coordinated attacks against Christian churches have 
taken place. There were a series of attacks on six Christian churches in 
Baghdad on October 16, 2004, killing at least one person and injuring nine 
more. On November 8, 2004, “car bombs exploded in front of the St. 
George and the St. Matthias church in Baghdad,” leaving at least three 
people dead and several others wounded.132 On January 29, 2006, car bombs 
targeted the Catholic Church of the Virgin Mary, the Orthodox Church in 
Kirkuk, Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, and an Anglican Church in Bagh-
dad killing at least three people and wounding nine.133 Attacks of this nature 
have led to cancellation of services by many churches and attendance at the 
remaining churches has dwindled.134
2. Numerous Christian religious leaders have been killed 
In addition, prominent Christian religious leaders have been tar-
geted. For example, the leader of Iraq’s Christian Syrian Community was 
killed in an attack on Qaraqosh, northeast of Mosul.135 On October 9, 2006, 
“Paulos Eskander, a priest from the Syriac Orthodox Church, was kid-
napped” and executed.136 Two Chaldean Catholic nuns were stabbed to 
death in Kirkuk in March 2007.137 Moreover, there have been reports of 
several other attacks on priests.138 In Mosul, a high-ranking priest “claimed 
that priests in Iraq can no longer wear their clerical robes in public for fear 
of being attacked by Islamists.”139
3. Many other Christians have been attacked and killed 
Other prominent Christians have also been attacked, such as surge-
on Ra’aad Augustine Qoryaqos, who was shot dead by three terrorists while 
making his hospital rounds.140 On March 18, 2005, “Ansar Al-Sunna, which 
mainly operates in Northern Iraq, announced the killing of a Christian gen-
132 UNHCR Background, supra note 108. 
133 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq [UNAMI], Human Rights Report: 1 January–28 Feb-
ruary 2006, para. 19 (2006).
134 Luo, supra note 107. 
135 Human Rights Report: 1 November–31 December 2006, supra note 111, at para. 56. 
136 Id.
137 Associated Press, Two Chaldean Catholic Nuns Stabbed to Death in North Iraq, Mar. 
28, 2007, available at http://www.aina.org/news/2007032791913.htm.  
138 See Barbara B. Baker, Iraqi Captors Release Chaldean Priest, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE,
Sept. 13, 2006, http://www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/freedom.html.  
139 U.N. Assistance Mission for Iraq [UNAMI], Human Rights Report: 1 September–31 
October 2006, para. 55 (2006). 
140 Nina Shea & James Y. Rajis, Christian Crisis, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2005, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/shea_rayis200501060730.asp. 
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eral of the Iraqi Army on its [] website.”141 In 2005, two Christian busi-
nessmen were abducted in Baghdad and murdered.142 “In February 2005, a 
Christian nurse was beheaded by her kidnappers.”143 According to the main 
Assyrian Christian news agency, thousands of Christians have been kid-
napped and held for ransom. Some have been killed if the ransom was not 
paid.144 Unfortunately, given the chaos in Iraq, it is difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions about how many Christians have been killed because of 
their religion, although the number is almost certainly higher than indicated 
by the examples that are described above.  
E. There is Evidence of a Specific Intent to Destroy the Iraqi Christian 
Community
The following factors may be relevant in assessing the existence of 
the requisite genocidal intent against the Christian community in Iraq:  
1. Statements accompanying attacks on churches are important evidence 
of genocidal intent 
While direct evidence of genocidal intent is rare, except where the 
accused confesses, statements made by the perpetrators can serve as impor-
tant evidence of the requisite genocidal intent.145 The statements that have 
been made in conjunction with attacks on Christian churches and leaders are 
the most important evidence of the attackers’ intent. For example, in the 
aftermath of the August 2004 church bombings, threats were issued by the 
militant group responsible for the attacks: “To the people of the crosses: 
Return to your senses and be aware that God’s soldiers are ready for you. 
You wanted a crusade and these are its results.”146
141 UNHCR Background, supra note 108. 
142 Shea, supra 140.  
143 UNHCR Background, supra note 108. 
144 Shea, supra note 140. Thousands more have received death threats and been warned 
that they should leave Iraq. Christians Live in Fear of Death Squads, supra note 121; Inte-
grated Regional Information Networks, Threats Force Iraqi Christians to Flee to Syria, Oct. 
15, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=61885.  
145 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 728 (Sept. 2, 
1998); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 538 
(May 21, 1999); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, Judgment, para. 933 (Jan. 
27, 2000); compare Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, paras. 986–87 
(Sept. 1, 2004) (noting that the “utterances of the accused” are one way to prove genocidal 
intent, but that they do not lead to the conclusion that the “Accused harbored the intent to 
destroy the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Croats of the ARK.”). 
146 Paul Isaac, The Assault on Assyrian Christians, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 8, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/05/08/opinion/edisaac.php. 
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There appears to have been a surge in anti-Christian violence fol-
lowing Pope Benedict XVI’s controversial public remarks on Islam.147 In 
September 2006, the Pope gave a speech at which he appeared to suggest 
that Islam was “evil and inhuman.”148 Extremist groups issued threats to kill 
all Christians unless the Pope apologized149 and warned of “reprisals against 
‘worshippers of the cross.’”150 According to the Catholic Asia News agency, 
Islamist militants distributed flyers across Mosul threatening that unless the 
local Catholic clergy condemned the Pope's remarks about Islam “Chris-
tians will be killed and churches burned down.”151 In October, unidentified 
men who attacked the Chaldean Church of the Holy Spirit in Mosul, wrote a 
message on the church doors: “If the Pope does not apologize, we will 
bomb all churches, kill more Christians and steal their property and mon-
ey.”152 In addition, anti-Christian graffiti has been scrawled on church 
walls153 and inflammatory CDs sold in the markets.154
These statements are powerful evidence of genocidal intent, particu-
larly the statements that suggest that all churches will be destroyed or that 
all Christians will be killed.155 Where available, such contemporaneous 
147 See, e.g., note 150 and accompanying text. 
148 The Pope quoted Manuel II Palaeologus, a fourteenth century Byzantine Emperor, dur-
ing a speech delivered on September 12, 2006, at the University of Regensburg in Bavaria, 
Germany, saying: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will 
find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he 
preached.” Pope Benedict XVI, Faith Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections, 
Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/ 
september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html. This re-
mark provoked criticism and anger from Muslim groups, especially in Iraq. Luo, supra note 
107, at A1. 
149 Luo, supra note 107, at AI. 
150 Jenny Booth, Al-Qaeda Threatens Jihad over Pope’s Remarks, THE TIMES ONLINE,
Sept. 18, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article642645.ece. 
Abu Jaffar, an Islamic extremist from Muhammad’s Army, a Sunni insurgent group stated: 
“Their leader [the Pope] has verbally abused and offended our religion and the Prophet. 
Unfortunately, he did not analyze the consequences of his speech. Our country is an Islamic 
land and they [Christians] will have to rely on the Pope’s charity from now on.” Christians
Live in Fear of Death Squads, supra note 121. 
151 Barbara G. Baker, Iraqi Kidnappers Behead Priest in Mosul, COMPASS, Oct. 12, 2006, 
http://www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/2006PDF/Iraq%202006.doc#_Toc156125637. 
152 Human Rights Report: 1 September–31 October 2006, supra note 139, at para. 54. 
153 Fairweather, supra note 104.
154 Id.
155 One significant downside to this evidence of genocidal intent is the apparent diversity of 
perpetrators. See Human Rights Report: 1 November–31 December 2006, supra note 111, at
paras. 30–32. It is often not clear which groups are committing which violent acts, nor is it 
clear what relationships the various groups have to one another. Consequently, while collec-
tively the evidence of genocidal intent is quite compelling, it might be difficult to attribute 
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statements by perpetrators are usually better evidence of intent than infe-
rences derived from other factors like the context or repetition of attacks 
because there is a more direct connection between the statement and the 
perpetrator’s intent. In this case study, they are accompanied by other fac-
tors that can be used to establish genocidal intent. 
2. Simultaneous attacks on churches and other religious buildings 
Simultaneous attacks on cultural and religious property and sym-
bols may also be evidence of genocidal intent.156 Since the U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, more than twenty-five churches in Iraq are reported to have 
been bombed. Some of the bombings of churches have already been re-
ferred to previously.157 Other religious buildings, including Christian 
schools, convents, and the residences of Christian religious leaders, have 
also been attacked. The attacks appear to have been coordinated, and come 
in waves, with multiple churches or religious buildings attacked in each 
wave. The attacks began in late 2003,158 with waves of attacks occurring in 
late 2004,159 early 2006,160 and late 2006.161
these statements to individual groups, even though the different groups appear to share simi-
lar aims. 
156 Supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
157 Supra notes 129–34. 
158 In 2003, there was a rocket attack on a convent in Mosul, explosions in two Christian 
schools in Baghdad and Mosul, and an explosion in a church in Baghdad on Christmas Eve. 
A bomb was found and defused in a monastery in Mosul. TANEJA, supra note 110, at 9.  
159 See Bomb Blasts Rocks Iraqi Churches, supra note 129; Car Bombs Target Christian 
Churches in Iraq, supra note 129. In addition, on December 7, 2004, a series of attacks on 
Armenian and Chaldean churches in Mosul caused substantial damage to property. See
UNHCR Background, supra note 108. These attacks created fear amongst the Christian 
community in Iraq and caused some to consider leaving the country. See Christians Talk of 
Leaving Iraq after Church Bombs, REUTERS, Oct. 17, 2004, available at 
www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/2004PDF/Iraq_2004.pdf. A car bomb also exploded 
outside the residence of the Apostolic Nuncio. Human Rights Report: 1 January–28 Febru-
ary 2006, supra note 135, at para. 19. An “Apostolic Nuncio” is the Pope's representative in 
another country, roughly the equivalent of an ambassador for the Holy See. J.P. Kirsch, 
Nuncio, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (2007), http://www.newadvent.org/catchen/11160a.htm. 
160 Rights Report: 1 January–28 February 2006, supra note 135, at para. 19 (2006). In 
addition, in February 2006, militants shot at a church near Al Sadr City, wounding a priest. 
Id.
161 On October 2, 2006, “in Mosul, a convent of Iraqi Dominican Sisters was fired upon.” 
Human Rights Report: 1 September–31 October 2006, supra note 139, at para. 55. On Octo-
ber 16, 2006, “in Mosul, unknown gunmen fired at AlSafena Church causing damage to the 
church.” Id. para. 56. 
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3. Other acts that are relevant to establishing special intent 
Genocidal intent can also be inferred from the context in which the 
anti-Christian violence is occurring and evidence of other violent or coer-
cive acts targeting Iraqi Christians.162 There have been reports of Iraqi 
Christians being forcibly converted to Islam,163 mass displacement of the 
Iraqi Christians within and across national borders,164 and forced com-
pliance with Islamic religious prescriptions.165 Acts such as mass exodus 
and displacement can be used as inferential evidence of the special intent to 
commit genocide.166 These will be discussed in greater depth in the section 
dealing with destruction of the Iraqi Christians as a group.  
F. Destruction of the Group  
The jurisprudence of international tribunals and learned commenta-
ries are far from unanimous in understanding what is meant by “destroy” in 
the chapeau of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. As a starting point, 
customary international law indicates that Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties should be used as a guide to interpreting 
the term.167 These articles suggest that “destroy” should be given its ordi-
nary meaning in its context and in light of its object and purpose.168 Only in 
the event that the ordinary meaning leads to an ambiguous or manifestly 
absurd result should supplementary means such as thenegotiating history be 
used to interpret the text of the Genocide Convention.169
If “destroy” is given its ordinary meaning, it should encompass sev-
eral meanings, such as (1) to ruin completely, (2) to tear down or break up, 
(3) to do away with (4) to kill, (5) to subdue or defeat completely, and (6) to 
162 See supra notes 129–34.
163 See infra notes 192–98 and accompanying text. 
164 See infra Part III.F.3. 
165 See infra notes 210–16 and accompanying text. 
166 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 33 (Apr. 19, 2004); see also
ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 99–100 (2003). 
167 It is generally accepted that these articles embody the current state of customary interna-
tional law regarding the interpretation of treaties. Stuart Ford, Legal Processes of Change: 
Article 2(4) and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 75, 
96 (1999). The Vienna Convention does not directly apply to the Genocide Convention be-
cause the Genocide Convention entered into force before the Vienna Convention. Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art 31(1), May 23, 1969, U.N.Doc. A/Conf.39/27; 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. Nevertheless, the customary rules embodied in Articles 31 and 32 should still 
guide the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. 
168 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 167, at art 31(1). 
169 Id. art. 32; see also Jan Klabbers, International Legal Histories: The Declining Impor-
tance of Travaux Preparatoires in Treaty Interpretation, L. NETH. INT’L L. REV. 267, 280–81 
(2003).
File: PETIT (July 14).doc Created on: 7/14/2008 12:51:00 PM Last Printed: 7/16/2008 10:38:00 PM 
2007–2008] RELIGIOUS GENOCIDE 191
render useless or ineffective.170 While one of the meanings of destroy is “to 
kill,” it is not the only one, and several meanings—like to subdue, defeat, or 
render useless—do not require the deaths of the things being destroyed. 
Thus, one would not expect “destroy” to require the deaths of the members 
of the group. This interpretation is supported by the fifth enumerated geno-
cidal act, the forcible transference of children from one group to another, 
which does not require the killing of the children, yet clearly constitutes 
genocide.171
Yet, the dominant interpretation of “destroy” in the early jurispru-
dence of the ICTY and the ICTR ignored this approach and confined de-
struction to only physical or biological acts. In Krstic, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber categorically held that “customary international law limits the 
definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological de-
struction of all or part of the group.”172 Later decisions from the ICTY and 
the ICTR followed this holding.173 This interpretation of “destruction” was 
adopted in an attempt to distinguish physical and biological acts of destruc-
tion from situations of “cultural” genocide, which the Krstic court found 
were excluded from the definition of genocide.174
At first glance, the drafting history of the Convention appears to 
support a limited interpretation of destruction,175 a position that has been 
endorsed by the International Law Commission.176 Nevertheless, there 
seems to be no legal reason why non-physical and biological acts (with the 
exception of cultural genocide) cannot be considered forms of “destruc-
170 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 538 (2d ed. 1989). 
171 The enumerated acts listed in Article 2 are part of the “context” of the treaty and are, 
therefore, an appropriate means of discovering the ordinary meaning of “destroy.” Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 167, art. 31(2) (noting that the context of a 
treaty includes the text of the treaty). 
172 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, para. 580 (Aug. 2, 2001), aff’d,
Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 25 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
173 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, (Sept. 1, 2004) para. 694 (citing 
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 25 (Apr. 19, 2004)) (the judg-
ment of the Appeals Chamber on Apr. 3, 2007, does not comment on this aspect of the Trial 
Chamber’s decision); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, para. 315 
(May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment, para. 808 
(Dec. 1, 2003). 
174 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, paras. 576–80 (Aug. 2, 2001). 
175 SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 229. Nevertheless, as Schabas notes, the negotiating history 
should not be used to alter the ordinary meaning of the terms unless the meaning is ambi-
guous or absurd. Id. at 229–30. Matthew Lippman has noted that the decision by the drafters 
of the Genocide Convention to remove provisions on cultural genocide was taken only after 
“persistent and prolonged debate” between delegates from different countries. Lippman, 
supra note 57, at 599. 
176 ILC Report, supra note 46, art. 17, para. 12. 
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tion.”177 Indeed, some recent judicial decisions indicate a trend towards ex-
panding destruction to cover conduct that goes beyond physical and biolog-
ical destruction.  
For instance, in Krajisnik an ICTY Trial Chamber held that “de-
struction,” as a component of the specific intent of genocide, could not be 
limited to physical or biological destruction of the group’s members, since 
the group could be destroyed in other ways, such as by transferring children 
out of the group.178 Judge Shahabuddeen’s partially dissenting opinion in 
Krstic stressed that while the enumerated acts described in clauses (a) to (e) 
of Article 2 must take a physical or biological form, the accompanying in-
tent to destroy the group need not always lead to physical destruction.179 He 
went on to argue that:  
[M]ere displacement does not amount to genocide. But, in this case, there 
was more than mere displacement. The killings, together with a deter-
mined effort to capture others for killing, the forced transportation or exile 
of the remaining population, and the destruction of homes and places of 
worship, constituted a single operation which was executed with intent to 
destroy a group in whole or in part. . . .180
In one of the most important recent genocide cases, the Blagojevic
Trial Chamber extensively analyzed past jurisprudence on the meaning of 
“destroy” and noted that recent developments indicated that the concept of 
destruction was expanding beyond physical and biological destruction.181 It 
referred to the Trial Chamber’s decision in Akayesu, which held that sexual 
violence against Tutsi women was integral to the process of destruction of 
177 SCHABAS, supra note 50, at 229 (noting that the words of the Genocide Convention can 
“certainly bear” a broader interpretation of destroy). It is also interesting that Raphael Lem-
kin, who coined the term genocide, had a broad understanding of destruction, which encom-
passed destruction of political institutions, economic life, language and culture with physical 
destruction as only the ultimate stage in genocide. Raphael Lemkin, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED
EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 79, 
87–89 (1944); see also Lippman, supra note 57, at 590 (noting that in Lemkin’s view, geno-
cide did not necessarily involve immediate extermination). Lippman notes that some early 
prosecutions for genocide adopted Lemkin’s broad approach. Id. at 593 (describing three 
early cases brought before the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland in 1946 and 1947). 
178 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, para. 854, n.1701 (Sept. 27, 
2006).
179 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 48 (Apr. 19, 2004) (Shaha-
buddeen, J., dissenting in part) (citation omitted). 
180 Id. at para. 57. 
181 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 658 (Jan. 17, 
2005) (citing Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, paras. 576–79 (Aug. 2, 
2001)).
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the Tutsis as a group, and could therefore constitute genocide.182 It also 
noted the Trial Chamber’s decision in Kayishema and Ruzindana, which 
held that acts falling short of death could fall within the concept of destruc-
tion of a group.183 Judge Shahabuddeen also found support in the separate 
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht in the Application of the Convention for the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, where he argued that 
[T]he forced migration of civilians, more commonly known as “ethnic 
cleansing,” is, in truth, part of a deliberate campaign by the Serbs to elimi-
nate Muslim control of, and presence in, substantial parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Such being the case, it is difficult to regard the Serbian acts 
as other than acts of genocide in that . . . they are intended to destroy that 
group, if not in whole certainly in part, to the extent necessary to ensure 
that that group no longer occupies the parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina co-
veted by the Serbs.184
As additional support, the Chamber referred to General Assembly Resolu-
tions that had equated “ethnic cleansing” with genocide,185 and quoted from 
the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court.186
The Blagojevic court concluded that physical or biological destruc-
tion of a group could be accomplished through means other than simply 
direct acts of killing. Such destruction is the “likely outcome of a forcible 
transfer of the population when this transfer is conducted in such a way that 
the group can no longer reconstitute itself—particularly when it involves the 
separation of its members.”187 Forcible transfer could thus lead to the ma-
terial destruction of the group, at least in its former state.188 The following 
182 Id. at para. 662 (citing Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 
731–32 (Sept. 2, 1998)). 
183 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 
para. 95 (May 21, 1999)). 
184 Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. and Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 431–32 (separate opinion 
of Judge Lauterpacht). 
185 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 664 (Jan. 17, 
2005) (citing G.A. Res.47/121, U.N. Doc. AG/Res/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
186 Id. at para. 664 (citing Bundesverfasungsgericht, [BverfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Dec. 12, 2000, 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfGE] (F.R.G.). 
The Federal Constitutional Court held that the limits of the extension of “destroy” to encom-
pass non-physical and non-biological destruction are only exceeded when the intention to 
destroy relates solely to the cultural identity of a group. The term “destroy” may thus include 
other means of destruction pertaining to the destruction of a group as a social unit in its spe-
cificity, uniqueness and feeling of belonging. Id.
187 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 666 (Jan. 17, 
2005).
188 Id.
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sections will examine the evidence that the Iraqi Christian group has been 
targeted for destruction in light of this legal discussion. 
1. The physical or biological destruction of Iraqi Christians 
As the facts above demonstrate, there have been numerous killings 
of Iraqi Christians. It is virtually impossible to determine how many Iraqi 
Christians have been killed as a result of religiously motivated violence,189
but it is certainly much higher than the number of dead recorded in the ex-
amples described above. The chaotic nature of the violence undoubtedly 
means that many more Christians have died than have been reported in the 
English language press.190 In fact, the number of deaths could possibly be in 
the tens of thousands.191 There is no question that these deaths constitute 
evidence of destruction for purposes of the Genocide Convention, but recent 
jurisprudence suggests that other forms of destruction should also be consi-
dered.
2. Forced conversions 
The United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq Human Rights Re-
port of December 2006 noted that Assyrians and other minority communi-
ties in the Nineveh plains region have been pressured to convert to Islam.192
In early 2007, insurgents in parts of Baghdad “demanded that Christians 
living there pay jizya, a head tax on non-Muslims living under Muslim 
rule,” convert to Islam,193 or leave.194 In early 2007, a militant Islamic group 
189 The authors have searched for but have been unable to locate any figures they consider 
reliable. 
190 See Gilbert Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional 
Cluster Sample Survey, 368 LANCET 1421, 1426–28 (2006) (noting that “passive surveillance 
measures” rarely accurately report the number of excess deaths and citing as an example that 
newspaper accounts of deaths in Guatemala between 1960 and 1990 under-reported excess 
deaths during years of high violence by a factor of twenty). 
191 At least one excess mortality survey has concluded that as many as 650,000 people have 
died as a result of violence in Iraq, with almost 600,000 of them dying from violent causes. 
See Burnham et al., supra note 190, at 6. Christians make up about 3% of the population of 
Iraq. See supra note 200. If Christians were being killed at the same rate as other groups, this 
would suggest a death toll of approximately 18,000 people. But the evidence suggests that 
Christians (and other minorities) have been disproportionately targeted in Iraq. Supra Part 
III.B. For example, Iraqi Christians seem to have been displaced at a rate nearly ten times 
higher than their overall representation in the population. See infra Part III.F.3. This may 
indicate that the Christian death toll is higher than 18,000. 
192 Human Rights Report: 1 January–28 February 2006, supra note 135, at para. 54.  
193 Kathleen Ridolfo, Iraq: Christian Population Dwindling Due to Threats, Attacks,
RADIO FREE EUROPE, May 31, 2007, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/05/a453003e-
dec4-491a-9069-81255c27a7fa.html. 
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issued a fatwa to the Assyrian Christian residents of Dora, a suburb in 
Baghdad ordering them to convert to Islam within twenty-four hours, or 
face death.195 The Muslim residents were also exhorted over the loudspeak-
ers of local mosques, to confiscate property of Christians and enforce the 
fatwa. This led to mass exodus of the Assyrian community from Dora.196
Some aspects of forced conversions are analogous to the crime of 
forcible transfer of children described in Article 2 of the Genocide Conven-
tion, and therefore should qualify as a form of destruction.197 Forcible trans-
fer of children and forced conversions both ultimately lead to the same re-
sult: the children of the protected group are prevented from becoming mem-
bers of the group, which eventually destroys the group.198 This suggests that 
forced conversions should be treated as a form of destruction. 
3. Mass exodus and displacement resulting in the destruction of the pro-
tected group 
One result of the high level of violence in Iraq is the movements of 
large numbers of people both across borders and internally within Iraq. Ac-
cording to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
at least 1.6 million people remain internally displaced in Iraq and a further 
1.6 to 1.8 million have fled to neighboring states.199 While minorities make 
up only about three percent of the Iraqi population,200 they form 30% of 
Iraqis who have fled since 2003 and are now seeking refugee status; the 
number of minority community refugees thus seems to be ten times their 
proportion of the Iraqi population.201 Mowfaq Abdul al Raoof, spokesman 
194 See Christians Fleeing Violence in Iraq, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 7, 2007, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,270377,00.html.  
195 Issac, supra note 146. 
196 Id. 
197 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, n.1701 (Sept. 27, 2006). 
198 Cf. Lippman, supra note 57, at 589, 598 (noting that the “relocation of adolescents into 
environments where they will be instilled with new customs, languages, religions and values 
was considered tantamount to the eradication of the next generation” by the drafters of the 
Genocide Convention). 
199 TANEJA, supra note 110, at 7. 
200 Minorities make up only three percent of the Iraqi population. Supra notes 105–09 and 
accompanying text. 
201 “An official from the UN refugee agency (UNHCR), speaking on condition of anonymi-
ty, told UN News Agency IRIN that minorities in Iraq make up about 30 percent of Iraqi 
refugees, whose total number is thought to be 1.8 million. . . . Iraq's religious minorities 
include Chaldean Catholics, Eastern Rite Catholics, Orthodox, Assyrian, Syriac, Sabaean-
Mandeans, Kaka’I [sometimes known as Ahl-e-Haqq], Armenians, Yazidis, Bahais, and 
Hebrews.” IRAQ: Minorities Living Tormented Days Under Sectarian Violence, Integrated 
Regional Information Networks, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx? 
ReportId=62981. 
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for the Ministry of Migration and Displacement in Iraq, stated that 
“[a]ccording to our estimates, nearly half of the minority communities have 
already fled to other countries.”202
A very large number of these refugees are Christian.203 “The Catho-
lic bishop of Baghdad, Andreos Abouna, was quoted recently as saying that 
half of all Iraqi Christians had fled the country since the 2003 U.S.-led inva-
sion.”204 Emmanuel Khosaba, the Syrian head of the Assyrian and Demo-
cratic Movement reported that more than 35,000 Iraqi Christians had fled to 
Syria by October 2006 because of individual threats from Muslim extrem-
ists and the general deterioration of security in Iraq.205
There is also significant internal displacement of Christians within 
Iraq.206 In 2007, “groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda issued a threat of ‘convert 
or be killed’” prompting an exodus of Christians in the district of Dora.207
Iraqi Christians are also leaving the city of Mosul for other parts of Nineveh 
Province because of anti-Christian violence.208 When combined with evi-
dence of the deliberate killings of large numbers of Iraqi Christians, this 
forced displacement of the Iraqi Christian population should be considered a 
form of destruction.209
202 Id.
203 Chaldo-Assyrian Christians are the largest religious minority group in Iraq. Ellen Mas-
sey, Iraq: Religious Minorities Hit from All Sides, Inter Press Service News Agency, July 31, 
2007, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38742. Christians formed the largest portion of 
new refugees arriving in Jordan’s capital Amman in the first quarter of 2006. “In Syria . . . 
44% of Iraqi asylum-seekers were recorded as Christian.” Mark Lattimer, ‘In 20 Years, 
There Will be No More Christians in Iraq,’ GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, Oct. 26, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1888848,00.html. 
204 TANEJA, supra note 110, at 7 (citation omitted). 
205 See Over 35,000 Christians have Fled Iraq, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 12, 2006, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1159193427145&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle
%2FShowFull.  
206 Some Christians are moving from Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra, towards the Kurdish 
regions in the north of the country. Human Rights Report: 1 September–31 October 2006,
supra note 139, at para. 57. Others are simply leaving Iraq’s cities for safer areas. It is re-
ported that one in four Christian families living in the major Iraqi cities has already left. Out 
of 20,000 Christian families in the Dora neighborhood of Baghdad before the U.S.-led inva-
sion of 2003, only 3,000 are left. Keith Roderick, Iraq’s Christian Exodus, NAT’L REVIEW 
ONLINE, Jul. 30, 2007 http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NjFlZTIyYjZjYjk1NmZhZT 
c2MmUxNzJjZmI4ZTI0MWI=. 
207 Damien McElroy, Christians Flee Iraq after Death Threats, DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 
10, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/08/wiraq08.xml.
The religious leaders of churches in Dora claim that their people are being killed just for their 
faith, and that this is being done with the complicity of the government of Iraq. Id.
208 Human Rights Report: 1 January–28 February 2006, supra note 135, at para. 19. 
209 See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 57 (Apr. 19, 2004) 
(Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting in part) (noting that forcible displacement should have been 
considered in light of the killings by the Bosnian Serb forces). 
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4. Enforcement of Islamic religious proscriptions 
Christians have been targeted by Islamic extremists for activities 
that supposedly fail to comply with Islamic beliefs. For example, selling 
alcohol, a traditional Christian occupation in Iraq, is now effectively prohi-
bited in many places. According to the Christian and Other Religions En-
dowment Bureau in Iraq,210 “approximately 95 percent of alcohol shops 
have closed following threats by Islamic extremists.”211 Liquor stores that 
have stayed open have sometimes been destroyed and the people running 
them have been killed.212
Women have also been subjected to abuse and humiliation for not 
wearing a veil.213 In Mosul, female students received leaflets warning them 
to wear proper “Muslim attire” at local universities.214 In the Sadr city sub-
urb of Baghdad, Shiite religious leader Mohammed al-Fartussi “threatened 
‘sinful women,’ alcohol sellers and cinemas of grave consequences if they 
did not stop their practices within a week.”215
Under a narrow definition of destruction, these acts might be 
viewed as simply the elimination of the religious identity of the protected 
group. Thus they might be dismissed as “cultural genocide” and not evi-
dence of true genocide. Nevertheless, under a slightly broader interpretation 
of destruction, these acts could be considered, along with evidence of wide-
spread killings, forced displacement, attacks on churches, and other support-
210 This is an Iraqi government ministry entrusted with supervision of religious estates. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR 2005:
IRAQ (2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2005/51600.htm. 
211 TANEJA, supra note 110, at 8. 
212 Naby & Galbraith, supra note 120, at 69; Salim Abraham, Iraqi Christians Flee to 
Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WITHOUT FRONTIERS, Aug. 3, 2004, www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom 
/news/2004PDF/Iraq_2004.pdf; Christopher Allbritton, Iraq’s Persecuted Christians, TIME,
Sept. 20, 2004, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,699409,00.html; Annia 
Ciezadlo, Iraq’s Christians Consider Fleeing as Attacks on them Rise, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, July 14, 2004; Kate Connolly, Christians Murdered for Selling Alcohol, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 9, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003 
/05/09/wirq409.xml; Rory McCarthy, ‘Iron Hand’ Cleric Issues Fatwa Amid Baghdad 
Chaos, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, May 21, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story 
/0,2763,960363,00.html. 
213 Zoepf, supra note 118. 
214 Human Rights Report: 1 September–31 October 2006, supra note 139, at para. 50. 
215 Associated Press, Shiite Leader in Baghdad Warns Women, Alcohol Sellers, Cinemas,
May 16, 2003, available at http://www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/iraq_2003.html# 
Shiiteleader.  
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ing evidence, as part of a larger policy of destroying Christian communities 
in Iraq.216
G. Substantial Portion 
Genocide must involve the intent to destroy a substantial portion of 
the group,217 which could be a reasonably significant number, relative to the 
total of a group as a whole, or a “significant section of the group such as its 
leadership.”218 There is no minimum number of deaths that is required, so 
long as it represents a “substantial part” of the group.219 For instance, in the 
case of the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebenica, the ICTY found that 
the deaths of approximately 7,000 people constituted a substantial portion of 
the relevant protected group.220 Unfortunately, there is very little evidence 
on the exact number of killings of Iraqi Christians.  
While the number of people killed in the examples described above 
is quite high, the casualties from these attacks alone would probably not 
constitute a significant part of the 600,000 to 800,000 Christians in Iraq.221
Nevertheless, there are likely to be many more killings that were religiously 
motivated, but that were not reported. In the absence of better data about the 
overall number of Christians killed in religiously-motivated violence in 
Iraq, it is impossible to make any firm conclusions about whether a substan-
tial portion of the group has been killed.222
A substantial portion of the group could also be destroyed if its lea-
dership was killed and the loss of that leadership would affect the survival 
of the group.223 Christian religious leaders have been targeted and killed, 
especially in the context of attacks against churches and other religious 
216 Cf. Application of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.), 1993 I.C.J. 407, 431 (Apr. 8) (separate 
opinion of Judge Lauterpacht). 
217 See supra notes 47–48 and accompanying text. 
218 Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, supra note 64, at para. 29. 
219 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Judgment, para.64 (June 7, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 13 (Apr. 19, 2004). 
220 Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, paras. 592–99 (Aug. 2, 2001); 
Prosecutor v. Kristic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, paras. 35, 37–38 (Apr. 19, 2004). The 
size of the protected group (i.e., Bosnian Muslims in and around Srebenica) was found to be 
about 40,000. Consequently, the Krstic court found that slightly less than 18% of a group 
was a substantial portion. There is no reason to believe that the figure 18% is particularly 
significant or that it represents some sort of minimum value below which genocide cannot 
occur. 
221 Supra note 107. 
222 Supra note 189–91 (discussing the difficulty of estimating the number of Christians 
killed in Iraq). 
223 See supra notes 64–65.  
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buildings in Iraq.224 The dwindling number of people attending church,225
and fear of priests to wear clerical robes in public226 suggest that these at-
tacks have had a significant impact on the Iraqi Christian leadership, and by 
extension, Iraqi Christians as a group. But in the absence of more detailed 
evidence on the scale and nature of this impact, it is difficult to say that a 
significant part of the leadership has been destroyed. 
H. Conclusion 
Assessing whether violence against the Christians in Iraq can be 
classified as religious genocide presents interesting challenges. The context 
of the violence against the Iraqi Christians, along with the targeting of reli-
gious leaders and buildings accompanied by statements advocating the de-
struction of Iraqi Christians supports an inference of the requisite genocidal 
intent. Nevertheless, while there is evidence to suggest that many Iraqi 
Christians have been subjected to acts of violence on account of their mem-
bership in a religious group, the lack of evidence about the number of 
deaths makes it difficult to know whether a substantial portion of the group 
has been destroyed. If the traditional interpretation of destruction is ex-
panded to include other acts such as mass displacement, forced conversions, 
and enforcement of Islamic proscriptions, seen in the context of kidnap-
pings, assaults, and attacks on religious property, it is more likely that a 
court would find that a substantial portion of the group has been destroyed. 
Unfortunately, the lack of evidence about the scope of the attacks on Iraqi 
Christians means it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions.
IV. VIOLENCE AGAINST MUSLIMS IN GUJARAT IN FEBRUARY 2002 
On February 27, 2002, two train carriages carrying Hindu activists 
were allegedly set on fire by a Muslim mob in the town of Godhra, in the 
Indian state of Gujarat,227 resulting in fifty-eight deaths, including women 
and children.228 The Hindu activists were returning from Ayodhya, in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh, where they had participated in a campaign led by the 
224 Supra notes Part III.D.1–2. 
225 Supra notes 134 and accompanying text. 
226 Supra notes 139 and accompanying text. 
227 Gujarat is one of twenty-eight states in the Indian federal structure and is located in the 
northwest of the country on the border with Pakistan. See States and Union Territories, 2005, 
http://india.gov.in/knowindia/state_uts.php (last visited Jan. 27, 2008); State Profile, 2007, 
http://gujaratindia.com/stateprofile/profile1.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).  
228 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU: STATE PARTICIPATION 
AND COMPLICITY AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN GUJARAT 4 (2002) [hereinafter WE HAVE NO
ORDERS TO SAVE YOU]. 
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Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP or World Hindu Council)229 to construct a 
temple to Ram, a Hindu deity, on the site of a sixteenth century mosque that 
had been destroyed by VHP supporters in December 1992.230 In response, 
from February 28 to March 3, 2002 there were widespread attacks through-
out Gujarat by Hindus against Muslims, involving killings, sexual violence, 
torture, destruction of property—including the destruction of places of wor-
ship—and the internal displacement of people.231 The violence continued 
for several months afterwards, despite the deployment of the Indian army in 
Gujarat.232
The Gujarat violence has been labeled “genocide” by various com-
mentators and reports,233 although the government has downplayed the se-
verity of the violence.234 Some of those responsible for crimes linked to the 
Gujarat violence have been convicted of murder, but it does not appear that 
Indian courts have addressed the question of whether the violence in Gujarat 
constituted genocide.235 This section assesses whether the reported violence 
meets the elements necessary to constitute genocide against a religious 
group.236
229 The VHP is a militant Hindu organization backed by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
The BJP was the ruling party in Gujarat and the central government of India at the time. See 
Ruling Party Wins Gujarat Poll, CNN.COM, Dec. 16, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002 
/WORLD/asiapcf/south/12/15/india.gujarat/index.html.
230 Vijay Joshi, Government Seizes Land Around Disputed Shrine in Ayodha, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Jan. 7, 1993; Tom Masland, Holy War in India, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 12, 1992, at 46; 
Testing India’s Structure, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 41.  
231 WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 4. 
232 Id.
233 See OXFAM INDIA AND THE BANGALORE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE AND RELIEF, GUJARAT 
GENOCIDE—2002: A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS (2002), http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/ 
reports/humanitarian-crisis.pdf [hereinafter OXFAM INDIA AND THE BANGALORE INITIATIVE 
FOR PEACE AND RELIEF]; INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR JUSTICE IN GUJARAT, A FEMINIST
ANALYSIS OF THE GENOCIDE IN GUJARAT (2003), http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/ 
reports/iijg/2003 [hereinafter A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF THE GENOCIDE IN GUJARAT]; Gujarat
2002—The Truth, TEHELKA, Nov. 3, 2007, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp? 
filename=Ne031107gujarat_sec.asp. 
234 See WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228; Press Trust of India, BJP Cites 
Government Statistics to Defend Modi, INDIA EXPRESS, May 12, 2005.  
235 See Hindus Jailed Over Gujarat Riots, BBC NEWS, Oct. 30 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk 
/2/hi/south_asia/7069809.stm; Rathin Das, 11 Convicted in Gujarat Riots Case, 8 Sentenced 
to Life, HINDUSTAN TIMES, Oct. 31 2007, http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage 
/StoryPage.aspx?id=b5c308f2-5afb-471e-aae29fd7a7fb3997&&Headline=11+convicted+in+ 
Gujarat+riots+case.
236 The elements of genocide are discussed above. See supra notes 47–48 and accompany-
ing text. 
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A. Muslims are a Protected Religious Group 
For the crime of genocide to be committed, the victims must be 
members of a racial, ethnical, national or religious group. A religious group 
is one whose members share the same religion.237 Islam is a recognized reli-
gion in India, where Muslims make up more than 13% of the population.238
Consequently, Muslims are a protected religious group. But the subject of 
this case study is not all Muslims, but a specific subset of the Muslim com-
munity—Muslims living in Gujarat. For genocide to be committed against 
them, they must constitute “part” of a group as defined in Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention. This will be analyzed in the section dealing with the 
requirement of destruction of the group “in part.” 
B. There is Evidence of Genocidal Acts 
There is no evidence to suggest that any of the acts enumerated in 
clauses (c) to (e) of Article 2 of the Genocide Convention were carried out 
against the Muslim community in Gujarat in February 2002. This section 
will focus on killings of members of the group and causing them serious 
bodily or mental harm.  
1. Killings
According to official government estimates, around 850 people 
were killed239 (later revised to 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus),240 but most 
observers have concluded that approximately 2000 people died, most of 
237 Supra note 53. 
238 CENSUS OF INDIA 2001, DATA ON RELIGION, available at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/ 
Census_Data_2001/India_at_glance/religion.aspx. India is a multi-religious state dominated 
by two religions, Hinduism and Islam, which together account for nearly 95% of the popula-
tion. According to the 2001 Indian census, India’s overall population is 80.5% Hindu and 
13.4% Muslim. The remaining 6.1% of the population is split between Christians, Sikh, 
Buddhists, Jains, and “Other Religions and Persuasions.” Id. Like India as a whole, Gujarat 
is also dominated by Hindus and Muslims—89.1% of the population is Hindu. Muslims 
make up 9.1% of the population, see Census Reference Table, C-Series Population by Reli-
gious Communities (2001), http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_data_ 
finder/C_Series/Population_by_religious_communities.htm. 
239 WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 4. The crime of killing requires 
that the victim must be dead; and the death must be attributable to an unlawful act of the 
accused. There is no quantitative requirement that must be satisfied in order to constitute 
killing. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
240 WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 4; BBC NEWS, Gujarat Riot 
Death Toll Revealed, May 11, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4536199.stm; 
Press Trust of India, BJP Cites Government Statistics to Defend Modi, INDIA EXPRESS, May 
12, 2005. 
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them Muslims, during the communal violence in Gujarat.241 As the descrip-
tions throughout this case study demonstrate, a large number of those deaths 
would probably be considered unlawful, particularly those that were the 
result of anti-Muslim mob violence.242 Accordingly, it appears that this 
physical element of genocide does exist. 
2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm 
“Serious bodily or mental harm” encompasses rape and acts of sex-
ual violence.243 Several reports have concluded that violence against women 
and girls was a key feature of the attacks against the Muslim population. 
The exhortations to commit rape and other acts of sexual violence against 
Muslim women were allegedly contained in pamphlets distributed by the 
VHP and RSS in Ahmedabad months before the massacre.244 According to 
reports, during the Gujarat violence, several hundred Muslim women and 
girls were sexually humiliated, mutilated, raped, or gang raped.245 Accord-
ing to local investigators, there were around 250 to 300 female victims 
among the dead, most of whom had either been raped or gang raped and in 
several cases, burnt alive.246
241 See WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 4; OXFAM INDIA AND THE 
BANGALORE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE AND RELIEF, supra note 233; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
Justice, the Victim- Gujarat State Fails to Protect Women from Violence, at 3, available at
http://coalitionagainstgenocide.org/reports/2005/ai.27jan2005.gujarat.pdf; Mark Oliver & 
Luke Harding, He is Blamed for the Death of 2000 Muslims in India. So Why is Narendra 
Modi in Wembley?, GUARDIAN, Aug. 18, 2003; Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, India in Crisis: Com-
ing Apart at the Seams, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 4 2002. 
242 For example, an Indian court has found that at least one instance of mob violence during 
the Gujarat riots constituted murder. See Hindus Jailed over Gujarat Riots, BBC NEWS, Oct. 
30 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7069809.stm. 
243 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 731 (Sept. 2, 1998) 
(“Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and mental 
harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the worst ways of inflict 
[sic] harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm.”). 
244 Genocide Gujarat, COMMUNALISM COMBAT 8, 77–78 (2002); Tanika Sarkar, Semiotics
of Terror, ECON. AND POL. WKLY, July 13, 2002, at 2872. 
245 A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF THE GENOCIDE IN GUJARAT, supra note 233, at 25–34; 
PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, VADODARA & VADODARA SHANTI ABHIYAN, AT THE 
RECEIVING END: WOMEN’S EXPERIENCES OF VIOLENCE IN VADODARA, 9–13 (2002), 
http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/pucl/receivingend.pdf.  
246 Justice, the Victim—Gujarat State Fails to Protect Women from Violence, supra note 
241, at 17. In one incident, a woman was gang raped, her womb cut open, the fetus ripped 
apart, hacked to pieces and thrown into the fire. Id. at 20. 
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C. Genocidal Intent 
In the case of the violence against the Muslims in Gujarat, several 
circumstantial factors are relevant to an establishment of genocidal intent:  
1. General political doctrine giving rise to the acts 
The general political doctrine that gave rise to the acts of violence 
against the targeted group can be used as inferential evidence of genocidal 
intent.247 The incidents leading up to the Godhra train incident and its af-
termath must be seen against the backdrop of the political situation in Guja-
rat and the buildup to the violence. The groups allegedly responsible for 
violence against Muslims in Gujarat include the VHP, the Bajrang Dal, and 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).248 All three of these groups belong to an 
umbrella organization called Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Vo-
lunteer Corps or RSS).249 These organizations “collectively form the sangh 
parivar (or “family” of Hindu nationalist groups).”250
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) was formed in 1964 to cover 
the social aspects of RSS activities.251 The VHP propagates RSS ideology to 
Hindus living abroad and holds conferences for Hindu religious leaders 
across India. It is involved in Sanskrit education, the organization of Hindu 
rites and rituals, and converting people from other religions to Hinduism.252
The Bajrang Dal is the militant youth wing of the VHP. It was formed in 
1984, during the Babri Masjid conflict,253 in order to mobilize youth for the 
Ram temple campaign.254 The BJP is the political wing of the sangh pari-
247 Supra notes 97 and accompanying text.
248 The BJP was the political party in charge of both the Indian central government and the 
state government of Gujarat at the time of the violence. WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU,
supra note 228, at 41–46. 
249 Id. at 39. “The RSS was founded in 1925 in Nagpur by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar with 
the mission of creating a Hindu state. Since its founding, it has propagated a militant form of 
Hindu nationalism which it promotes as the sole basis for national identity in India.” Id. 
Western thought and civilization are labeled as enemies of Hindu culture and Islam and 
Christianity are depicted as alien religions of foreign invaders—the Mughals and the British. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
250 WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 4. 
251 See S.S. Apte, Why Vishva Hindu Parishad, VHP, http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/a-
origin_growth/whyvhp.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2008).  
252 See Aims Vishua Hindu Parishad, In Service of Poor, http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/b-
objectives/aim_object.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). 
253 See supra note 230 and accompanying text (describing the Babri Masjid conflict). 
254 N.K. Singh & Uday Mahurkar, Bajrang Dal: Loonies at Large, INDIA TODAY, Feb. 2, 
1999, at 26. The Bajrang Dal has a fairly loose organizational structure and initially operated 
under different names in different states. Id.
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var.255 The BJP came to power in Gujarat in 1995, and since 1998 has been 
associated with an increasing “Hinduisation” of the state.256
Parallel to the rise of the BJP in Gujarat, Hindu nationalist groups in 
the state have become more prominent and violent. Gujarat has witnessed 
successive episodes of Hindu-Muslim violence in 1969, 1985, 1989 and 
1992.257 Fliers proclaiming India as a Hindu country and containing hate 
speech directed against Muslims and Christians were allegedly circulating 
in Gujarat since at least 1998.258
2. Systematic targeting of Muslims as a group and attacks on religious 
symbols 
Genocidal intent may also be established by evidence that victims 
were systematically targeted because of their membership in a particular 
group and by evidence of simultaneous attacks on cultural and religious 
property and symbols.259 Muslims, as a distinct group, were the target of 
violence in the aftermath of the train attack at Godhra. For example, Muslim 
houses were deliberately targeted.260 According to reports, a few days be-
fore the attack at Godhra, Hindu houses in Muslim dominated areas had 
been marked out with easily identifiable Hindu symbols such as saffron 
flags and pictures of Hindu deities and were spared from attacks.261 Islamic 
255 The Jana Sangh Party was formed in 1951 as the political wing of the RSS, it was re-
placed by the Bharatiya Janata Party in 1980. See Shri K. R. Malkani, BJP History: It’s Birth 
and Early Growth, BJP, http://www.bjp.org/history/history.html.  
256 See generally WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 41–46 (2002). 
Narendra Modi’s appointment as chief minister of Gujarat in 2001 was considered a signifi-
cant victory for the RSS, as Mr. Modi is a RSS pracharak (a volunteer who propagates RSS 
philosophy). New Chief Minister for Gujarat, BBC NEWS, Oct. 4, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1579033.stm; V. Venkatesan, A Pracharak as 
Chief Minister, FRONTLINE, Oct. 13, 2001, http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1821/ 
18210310.htm.
257 WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 45. 
258 Id. at 43–44. 
259 Supra note 99.  
260 In Sabarkantha district for instance, around 1,500 Muslim houses and 1,200 Muslim 
businesses were reportedly burned. Ashish Khetan, Sabarkantha: Nowhere to Run, TEHELKA,
Nov. 3, 2007, http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp?filename=Ne031107 
Sabarkantha.asp.  
261 2 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE 24 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/index.html [hereinafter 2 CONCERNED CITIZENS 
TRIBUNAL]. Muslim houses in certain localities were completely destroyed whereas Hindu 
houses in the same area stood unscathed. WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 
228, at 15. Also, Hindus and even some Muslims deliberately put prominent Hindu religious 
symbols outside their houses, both during and after the massacre in the hope that this would 
protect them from attack. Id. at 36; Amit Mukherjee, Shops in Gujarat Wear Religion on 
Their Sleeves, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 17, 2002, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ 
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religious symbols were also targeted. Mosques, dargahs (shrines or tombs 
of Muslim saints), and other places of Muslim religious significance were 
damaged.262 Copies of the Qur’an were damaged or destroyed in towns and 
villages all over Gujarat.263 In addition, Muslim men, women, and children 
were allegedly burned alive as a deliberate method of terrorizing the Mus-
lim population, because Muslims bury their dead, while Hindus cremate 
them.264
3. Utterances of the perpetrators and attacks on pregnant women 
Muslim women were particularly targeted by Hindu attackers as 
symbols of the community that they sought to humiliate and destroy—not 
only as bearers of children, but also as a target of revenge for the supposed 
historical defilement of Hindu women by Muslim men during repeated 
“Muslim” invasions of the “motherland.”265 Some survivors reported rapists 
shouting that they intended to impregnate them with “little Hindus,” and 
pregnant women were allegedly attacked so as to destroy the fetus.266
The use of the words “little Hindus” by the perpetrators during 
rapes is strongly suggestive of a genocidal intent.267 These words imply that 
the goal of the crime was not just rape of Muslim woman, but the destruc-
tion of the Muslim group. The perpetrators appeared to believe that by rap-
ing Muslim women, they could ensure that the children born of the rapes 
would not be Muslim. This implies that their intent was the destruction of 
articleshow/4095645.cms.  
262 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE 48 (2002) [herei-
nafter 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL]; Ashish Khetan, Conspirators & Rioters: A Cold 
Eclipse, TEHELKA, Nov. 3, 2007, available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp? 
filename=Ne031107A_Cold.asp. 
263 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 43.
264 Ashish Khetan, Conspirators & Rioters: A Cold Eclipse, TEHELKA, Nov. 3, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp?filename=Ne031107A_Cold.asp. 
265 A FEMINIST ANALYSIS OF THE GENOCIDE IN GUJARAT, supra note 233, at 69; According 
to Amnesty International “Women were raped while the rapists chanted Hindu slogans; the 
weapons with which women’s wombs were cut open were trishuls and swords; the bodies of 
the victims were not left where they fell but burned in the way Hindus cremate their dead. 
Witnesses reported that in some cases, the syllable ‘Om’ which has religious significance in 
Hinduism was cut into the bodies and skulls of victims.” AMNESTY INT’L, INDIA: JUSTICE,
THE VICTIM—GUJARAT STATE FAILS TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 17 (Jan. 27, 
2005), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA20/001/2005. 
266 INDIA: JUSTICE, THE VICTIM—GUJARAT STATE FAILS TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM
VIOLENCE, supra note 265, at 20. 
267 Id. Genocidal intent may be inferred from the utterances of the accused at the time of 
commission of the crimes. See Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judg-
ment, paras. 986–87 (Sept. 1, 2004).  
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the group.268 The deliberate rape of women so as to destroy unborn children 
of the target group may also be an indication of genocidal intent by the per-
petrators.269
4. Statements by leaders advocating violence and other forms of hate 
speech 
Statements made by the leaders at the time of the violence may be 
used to infer the special intent to commit genocide.270 Several pamphlets 
and newspaper articles advocating violence against Muslims, economic 
boycott of Muslim commercial establishments, and sexual violence against 
Muslim women were in circulation before, during, and after the Gujarat 
violence.271 Pamphlets advocating an economic boycott of the Muslim 
community resurfaced in 2002, in the months preceding the Godhra train 
attack.272
In the aftermath of the Godhra train burning, Pravin Togadia, inter-
national general secretary of the VHP, allegedly stated that “[t]his has never 
happened in the history of independent India. Hindu society will avenge the 
Godhra killings. Muslim[s] should accept the fact that Hindus are not wear-
ing bangles. We will respond vigorously to all such incidents.”273 Jaideep 
Patel, the Joint Secretary of the VHP in Gujarat declared on February 27, 
2002, “[w]hoever stays with us will benefit. You can see the results in UP 
[Uttar Pradesh]. In this country whoever stays with the Hindu community 
and Hindutva, will benefit, or they will suffer.”274 Local newspapers such as 
Sandesh reportedly contributed to inciting communal violence with head-
lines such as “Avenge Blood with Blood,” running unverified reports of 
268 See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, paras. 507–08 (Sept. 2, 
1998) (noting that raping a woman with the intent that the offspring of the rape will not be-
long to the mother’s group is a form of genocide). 
269 In the context of rape and sexual violence against women, statements by the accused 
advocating the killing of pregnant women so as to prevent the perpetuation of the target 
group have been held to demonstrate the existence of genocidal intent. .See id. at para. 21. 
270 Supra note 145. 
271 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, Gujarat Annexure, supra note 261, at 11 (2002),
http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/volI/annex/annex11.html. Fliers circulated in August 1998 
proclaimed: “India is a country of Hindus . . . Our religion of Rama and Krishna is pious. To 
convert [or] leave it is a sin.” Another flier by the VHP in Bardoli, Gujarat, warned, “Caution 
Hindus! Beware of inhuman deeds of Muslims . . . . Muslims are destroying Hindu Commu-
nity by slaughter houses, slaughtering cows and making Hindu girls elope. Crime, drugs, 
terrorism are Muslim’s empire.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS:
ATTACKS AGAINST CHRISTIANS IN INDIA 18 (1999). 
272 Anosh Malekar, Silence of the Lambs, THE WEEK, Apr. 7, 2002. 
273 Call to Arms, COMMUNIALISM COMBAT, Mar.–Apr. 2002, http://www.sabrang.com/cc/ 
archive/2002/marapril/arms.htm. 
274 Id.
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sexual assaults on Hindu women, and publishing graphic photographs of 
charred bodies of the Godhra victims.275
In the aftermath of the violence, Ashok Singhal, the working presi-
dent of the VHP allegedly described Gujarat as a “successful experiment” in 
raising Hindu consciousness, which would be repeated all over the coun-
try.276 At the height of the killings, on March 1, 2002, Narendra Modi, the 
Chief Minister of Gujarat described the riots as “resulting from the natural 
and justified anger of the people.”277 Praveen Togadia, the international 
general secretary of the VHP stated that the “time was ripe for forming a 
separate army of Hindu youths who would protect the religion from attacks 
by jehadis.”278 In December 2002, after the BJP party’s decisive win in the 
state assembly elections in Gujarat, Togadia reportedly asserted that the 
experiment of the “Hindutva lab” would be repeated in other parts of the 
country and that “[a] Hindu Rashtra [state] can be expected in the next two 
years. . . . We will change India’s history and Pakistan’s geography by 
then.”279
5. Evidence of advanced preparation for the attacks 
The nature of the violence indicates that the attacks were premedi-
tated.280 Allegedly, meetings of Sangh Parivar members were held in ad-
vance, where strategies for attacking the Muslims were formulated and 
plans for providing legal assistance to Hindus who may face legal action for 
their part in the riots were discussed.281 The attacks were carried out by 
mobs, sometimes running into thousands of people, led by organizers alle-
gedly carrying lists of the names and addresses of Muslims.282 Mobs were 
275 PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, VIOLENCE IN VADODARA: A REPORT 140–62, June
26, 2002, http://www.onlinevolunteers.org/gujarat/reports/pucl/vv_chapter7.pdf. 
276 We’ll Repeat Our Gujarat Experiment, INDIAN EXPRESS, Sep. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.indianexpress.com/res/web/pIe/archive_full_story.php?content_id=8831.
277 Gujarat Used as Hindutva Laboratory, ASIAN AGE, Mar. 25, 2002, reprinted in WE
HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 34. He also went on record to say that 
“Relief camps are actually child making factories. Those who keep on multiplying the popu-
lation [Muslims] should be taught a lesson.” HINDU (Chennai), Sep. 10, 2002, reprinted in 1
CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 259. 
278 Seers’ Meet Calls For Protection of Temples, TIMES OF INDIA, Oct. 18, 2002, available
at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/25511906.cms. 
279 ‘Hindu Rashtra’ in Two Years: Togadia, REDIFF, Dec. 15, 2002, http://www.rediff.com/ 
election/2002/dec/15guj13.htm. 
280 The context of the perpetration of the acts and the existence of a genocidal plan are 
relevant to an establishment of the requisite special intent. See supra notes 93–99. 
281 Ashish Khetan, Legal Subversion: Justice. Blind to the Victim, TEHELKA, Nov. 3, 2007, 
available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp?filename=Ne031107Justice.asp.
282 WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 5. Professor Keshavram Kashi-
ram Shastri, the chairman of the Gujarat unit of the VHP publicly stated that the list of shops 
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equipped in advance with weapons such as swords, trishuls,283 and guns.284
Some of the trucks and other vehicles that carried people chanting anti-
Muslim slogans like “Hindus are children of Lord Rama, Muslims are bas-
tards” and “Jai Shri Ram”285 were brought into Gujarat from other Indian 
states. 
6. Participation in the anti-Muslim violence by the police 
There is evidence that some members of the police participated in 
the violence in Gujarat. For example, the police were accused of favoring 
the Hindu mobs.286 There were numerous allegations of police officers not 
responding to calls for help from Muslims under attack. Most prominently, 
former MP Ehsan Jafri made repeated calls for police assistance when his 
house was surrounded by a mob that eventually killed him and everyone 
who had taken shelter with him.287 Police officers who tried to control the 
violence or act against the leaders of the mobs were allegedly transferred to 
other locations or job postings, or were reprimanded by their superiors.288
The police were also accused of frustrating attempts to initiate legal pro-
ceedings against those responsible for the violence. Some policemen alle-
gedly filed incorrect First Information Reports289 (FIRs), or refused to write 
owned by Muslims in Ahmedabad was prepared on the morning of February 28. Sheela 
Bhatt, It Had to be Done, VHP Leader Says of Riots, REDIFF.COM, Mar. 12, 2002, 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/mar/12train.htm.  
283 A traditional trident used by Hindus both as a religious symbol and a weapon. See Kavi-
ta Srivastava, Communalising Rajasthan, PEOPLE’S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES, April 2003, 
http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Religion-communalism/2003/communal-rajasthan.htm. 
284 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 99. 
285 Literally: “Hail Lord Rama” (a Hindu deity). Dushehra: The Victory of Good over Evil,
http://www.gurjari.net/ico/Festival/main.asp?item=H_002.  
286 The attitude of the police was best summarized in a news telecast of the remarks of 
Ahmedabad’s police commissioner, PC Pandey: “These people [the police] also, they some-
how get carried away by the overall general sentiment.” 2 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL,
supra note 261, at 84. 
287 2 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 85; see also Police Chief Vanishes 
as Rajkot Burns, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 1, 2002, available at
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2461130.cms; The Police Watched as We 
Were Attacked, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 2, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS 
TRIBUNAL, CITIZENS FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE 256 (2002), available at
http://www.sabrang.com/tribunal/tribunal1.pdf; Police Fails to Provide Security to Activist, 
ASIAN AGE, Mar. 6, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 
256.
288 Basant Rawat, Minority Hole in Gujarat Police Force, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 26, 2002,
reprinted in WE HAVE NO ORDERS TO SAVE YOU, supra note 228, at 23. 
289 Id. (A First Information Report is a written report prepared by the police in India when 
they receive information about the commission of a certain class of crimes known as “cog-
nizable offences.” It is usually filed by the victim of a crime but can be filed by anyone who 
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down the names of assailants identified by the victims while registering 
FIRs.290 Finally, some police officers were accused of committing crimes 
against the Muslim population, including sexual misconduct.291
D. Destruction of a Substantial Portion of the Group 
The violence against Muslims was widespread and took place 
throughout Gujarat. A report by the National Commission on Human 
Rights292 found that: (1) the mobs involved in the major incidents contained 
between five and fifteen thousand people; (2) there were mob attacks on 
minority communities in more than 1,200 villages leading to a large scale 
exodus of members of those minority groups; and (3) more than one hun-
dred mosques and dargahs were desecrated and damaged in Ahmedabad, 
the capital of Gujarat, and about 500 in other parts of Gujarat state.293 In an 
order relating to the holding of general elections in Gujarat, the Election 
Commission of India294 noted that twenty out of the twenty-five districts in 
Gujarat had been affected by the communal violence and riots.295 It is esti-
has knowledge that a crime has been committed. A police investigation can begin only after 
an FIR has been received). COMMONWEALTH HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE, FIRST INFORMATION 
REPORT & YOU, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/fir.pdf.  
290 Failing the People, INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 13, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED 
CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 256; FIR Says Muslim MLA Led Riot Mob, ASIAN
AGE, Mar. 23, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 257. 
Even when FIRs are reported, the police fail to enforce the law.  
291 Minors Shot by Police, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 1, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED 
CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 255; 6 Deaths After Mob Attack, Police Call It ‘As-
phyxiation,’ INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 5, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL,
supra note 261, at 256; We Were Just Watching, Why Did They Fire At Us?, INDIAN
EXPRESS, Mar. 22, 2002, reprinted in 1 CONCERNED CITIZENS TRIBUNAL, supra note 261, at 
256–57.
292 The National Human Rights Commission is an autonomous statutory body set up under 
the Protection of Human Rights 1993 to enquire into allegations of violations of human 
rights as well as promote research into and implementation of human rights standards. Na-
tional Human Rights Commission, FAQ’s About NHRC, http://nhrc.nic.in/FAQ.htm. 
293 Y.S.R. MURTHY, NAT’L HUMAN RTS. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE VISIT OF NHRC TEAM 
HEADED BY CHAIRPERSON, NHRC TO AHMEDABAD, VADODRA AND GODHRA FROM 19–22
MARCH 2002 (Mar. 31, 2002), http://nhrc.nic.in/guj_annex_1.htm. 
294 The Election Commission is a permanent autonomous constitutional authority entrusted 
with the task of conducting elections to the Parliament and State legislatures, and to the 
offices of the President and the Vice-President of India. Election Commission India, About
ECI, http://www.eci.gov.in/about-eci/the_setup.asp.
295 Press Release, Shangara Ram, Election Comm’n of India, Press Note: General Elections 
to the Gujarat Legislative Assembly paras. 18–19, (Aug. 16, 2002), http://www.eci.gov.in 
/Press/current/PN_16082002.pdf.
  The Election Commission specifically rejected the Gujarat state government’s report on 
law and order, which concluded that the riots were confined to a few pockets in twelve dis-
tricts of the state. Id.
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mated that around 2000 people were killed, most of them Muslim,296 and 
several thousand people were injured, subjected to violence or displaced.297
Despite the widespread nature of the violence, the actual number of 
deaths caused by the violence was small when compared to the overall Mus-
lim population of Gujarat.298 While some areas witnessed large numbers of 
killings, such as the localities of Naroda Gaon and Naroda Patiya in Ahme-
dabad (allegedly, 200 people were killed, though the official estimates are 
105), the rioting and killings were spread over a large number of districts.299
With a few exceptions such as MP Ehsan Jafri,300 the killings did not seem 
to target prominent persons within the community or religious leaders.  
The dominant interpretation of “destroy” would require that the acts 
in Gujarat result in the physical or biological destruction of a substantial 
portion of the protected group before they could be considered genocide.301
There is no minimum number of people that must be killed, but the number 
of deaths must be significant enough to impact the survival of the group.302
In this case, the relatively low number of deaths (relative to the overall pop-
ulation of the state) does not seem to be large enough to adversely impact 
the survival of Muslims in all of Gujarat.303
If a more expansive definition of destroy was used, this conclusion 
might change. There is evidence that several hundred Muslim women in 
Gujarat were victims of religiously-motivated sexual violence. Moreover, 
several thousand people were injured or displaced by the violence.304 There 
were also several hundred attacks on Muslim religious buildings.305 These 
additional factors strengthen the argument that a substantial portion of the 
Muslim population of Gujarat was targeted. Nevertheless, it is not clear 
whether the addition of these factors would be enough to satisfy a court. 
It may be possible to overcome these difficulties by adjusting the 
geographic limits of the claimed genocide. There is no legal requirement 
that the geographic limits of the genocide must cover the whole state of 
296 Supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
297 Ram, supra note 296. 
298 Gujarat had a Muslim population of approximately 4.5 million at the time. CENSUS OF 
INDIA 2001, supra note 238.  
299 Ashish Khetan, Conspirators & Rioters: Ahmedabad: Carnage Capital, TEHELKA, Nov. 
3, 2007, available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp?filename=Ne031107 
Ahmedabad.asp.
300 Supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
301 See supra notes 46–48. 
302 See supra notes 59–60. 
303 This supposition, of course, could be rebutted by evidence that the deaths did impact the 
survival of the group. The authors have found no such evidence. 
304 Supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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Gujarat. The geographic scope could be more limited so long as the perpe-
trators viewed the targeted part as a distinct entity within the larger group.306
Focusing on locations that suffered disproportionately at the hands of the 
mob, like individual districts or the city of Ahmedabad, might allow for the 
framing of a geographic area within which a substantial portion of the Mus-
lim population was affected.307
E. Conclusion 
At first glance, several factors strongly support the characterization 
of the violence against the Muslim community in Gujarat in February 2002 
as religious genocide. Muslims in Gujarat were apparently targeted on ac-
count of their religious affiliation, killed, tortured, raped, and sexually 
abused; their property was looted, and their religious symbols and buildings 
were desecrated. The attacks were systematic and organized, carried out in 
the context of a history of religious conflict in Gujarat, and accompanied by 
statements inciting violence against Muslims. 
If a more liberal interpretation of destruction was adopted, the 
widespread nature of the violence, the scale of atrocities committed, and the 
concerted attacks on religious symbols, along with the incitement to vi-
olence, might be sufficient to establish that a substantial portion of the Mus-
lim community was targeted. However, under an interpretation of destruc-
tion that requires physical or biological destruction of the group, the number 
of killings probably does not constitute the destruction of a substantial por-
tion of the Muslims in Gujarat. The problems associated with the “substan-
tial portion” requirement might be overcome by limiting the geographic 
scope of the claimed genocide to only the worst affected areas of Gujarat 
state. 
V. GENOCIDE AS THE “CRIME OF CRIMES”
There are three crimes—war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide—that are most often prosecuted under international law. All three 
of these international crimes have contextual elements that set them apart 
from crimes that punish similar physical acts under domestic law (e.g., 
murder). For war crimes, the required contextual elements are the existence 
of an armed conflict308 and a nexus between the alleged crimes and the 
306 See supra notes 61–62. 
307 See, e.g., Ashish Khetan, Conspirators & Rioters: Ahmedabad: Carnage Capital,
TEHELKA, Nov. 3, 2007, available at http://www.tehelka.com/story_main35.asp?filename= 
Ne031107Ahmedabad.asp (noting particular locations that bore the brunt of the anti-Muslim 
violence). 
308 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 83 (Nov. 30, 2005) (citing 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, para. 562 (May 7, 1997)) (“In order for 
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armed conflict.309 For crimes against humanity, the contextual elements are 
the existence of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian popula-
tion and that the alleged crimes must be part of the attack.310 Genocide, too, 
has its contextual elements; the genocidal acts must be carried out against 
members of a protected group,311 and the acts must result in the destruction 
of a substantial portion of the protected group.312
What distinguishes genocide from war crimes and crimes against 
humanity is the additional requirement of specific intent. All three crimes 
require proof that the physical acts were committed intentionally. For ex-
ample, the war crime of willful killing requires that the accused intended to 
kill the victim or that he or she intended to seriously harm the victim while 
knowing that such injury was likely to cause death.313 The intent require-
ment for killing as a crime against humanity is essentially identical.314 Proof 
the Tribunal to have jurisdiction over crimes punishable under Article 3 of the Statute . . . 
[t]here must be an armed conflict, whether international or internal . . .”); Prosecutor v. Stru-
gar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Judgment, para. 215 (Jan. 31, 2005); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda,
Case No. ICTR-96-3, Judgment, para. 91 (Dec. 6, 1999). 
309 Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, para. 91 (Nov. 30, 2005) (citing 
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, paras. 572–73 (May 7, 1997)) (“[T]o 
meet the jurisdictional preconditions of Article 3 of the Statute, the Prosecution must estab-
lish not only the existence of an armed conflict but also a sufficient link between the alleged 
acts of the accused and the armed conflict. . . .”); Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-
T, Judgment, para. 28 (Nov. 16, 2005); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
Judgment, para. 438 n.807 (June 1, 2001); Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. 
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, para. 169 (May 21, 1999) (“[T]here must be a nexus between the 
crime and the armed conflict.”). 
310 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7(1), July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
999 [hereinafter ICC Statute], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/official 
journal/Rome_Statute_120704-EN.pdf. (“For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against 
humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack directed against any civilian population . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Deronjic, Case 
No. IT-02-61-A, Judgment on Sentencing Appeal, para. 109 (July 20, 2005) (“The acts of the 
accused need only be a part of the attack . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, 
Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, para. 99 (June 12, 2002) (“The acts of the 
accused must constitute part of the attack.”); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-
T, Judgment, para. 326 (May 15, 2003) (“A crime against humanity must have been commit-
ted as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on discrimi-
natory grounds. Although the act need not be committed at the same time and place as the 
attack or share all of the features of the attack, it must, by its characteristics, aims, nature, or 
consequence objectively form part of the discriminatory attack.”). 
311 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra notes 59–60. 
313 Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, para. 36 (Dec. 17, 
2004); Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, para. 381 (Sept. 1, 2004). 
314 Prosecutor v. Blagojevic & Jokic, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, para. 556 (Jan. 17, 
2005) (“The elements of the offence of murder as a crime against humanity and as a violation 
of the laws or customs of war are the same.”). 
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of killing for genocide also requires evidence that the killing was intention-
al.315 However, a prosecutor seeking a genocide conviction must also show 
that the accused acted with the intent of destroying the protected group to 
which the victim belongs.316
As these case studies show, the additional requirement of proof of 
specific intent makes it harder to prove a case for genocide than it is for war 
crimes or crimes against humanity. For example, the situations in Iraq and 
Gujarat could both qualify as crimes against humanity.317 The events de-
scribed in Iraq might also qualify as war crimes.318 Yet, there would be 
problems with any attempt to treat the case studies as genocide.319 Those 
problems might be overcome, but it is generally harder to secure a convic-
tion for genocide than for war crimes or crimes against humanity.  
This added evidentiary burden may be one of the reasons genocide 
is sometimes referred to as the “crime of crimes.”320 It is not only viewed as 
the most serious crime in international law, it is also the most difficult to 
prove. As a result, prosecutions are quite rare. There are simply fewer cases 
of genocide than war crimes or crimes against humanity. The overall scarci-
ty of genocide convictions may help explain why there have been so few 
successful prosecutions for religious genocide.321
While it is important that the gravity of the crime of genocide is not 
diluted, recent genocide jurisprudence demonstrates a slow but steady de-
velopment of the elements of genocide. There appears to be a trend towards 
broadening the interpretations of “destroy,” what can be considered destruc-
tion “in part” of a group, and the kinds of circumstantial evidence that may 
be used to infer the existence of genocidal intent. International and interna-
tionalized criminal tribunals must walk a fine line between upholding the 
315 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, para. 319 
(May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 515 (July 31, 
2003) (“As regards the underlying acts, the word ‘killing’ is understood to refer to intentional 
but not necessarily premeditated acts.”). 
316 See supra note 47–48. 
317 While there is no space to address this point in detail, the evidence described above in 
Parts III & IV suggests that the violence in Iraq and the violence in Gujarat were both carried 
out as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. 
318 This would depend on whether or not there is an armed conflict in Iraq. This question is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
319 See supra Sections II–IV. 
320 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, para. 16 (Sept. 4, 
1998) (noting that genocide, because of its special intent requirement, is the most serious 
crime in international law—the “crime of crimes”); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-
96-13-A, Judgment and Sentence, paras. 979–81 (Jan. 27, 2000); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case 
No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, para. 502 (July 31, 2003) (adopting the ICTR’s description of 
genocide as the “crime of crimes”). 
321 Cf. supra notes 2–6. 
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status of genocide as the most serious of international crimes and progres-
sively developing the elements of the crime of genocide to ensure that, in 
legitimate cases, prosecutions for genocide are possible.
